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Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of  
Corporate Governance 
 
Véronique Magnier* & Darren Rosenblum** 
 
Abstract: The French adoption of a corporate board quota for women reflects 
Europe’s increasingly stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate governance, one 
that stands in marked contrast with that of the United States.  This Article discusses 
how the corporate board quota will shift French and European corporate 
governance.  The change accentuates an already established stakeholder corporate 
culture widespread in Europe, most notably evidenced by the presence of worker 
representation on boards.  In contrast, the United States’ corporate governance 
structure increasingly places the shareholder at its center.  The proliferation of 
quotas for women on corporate boards in the national and transnational European 
contexts is a factor that will further distinguish European corporate governance 
regimes from those of the United States.  France’s extensive history of public 
participation in private corporate governance stands in contrast with the liberal 
contract and property system of the United States.  These historical divergences of 
stakeholder or shareholder orientations stand apart: in the United States, attention to 
stakeholder inclusion has remained an academic exercise, while French and 
European governance embodies substantial stakeholder inclusion.  Integrating a 
critical mass of women into the world’s largest economy’s corporate management 
will revolutionize capital structures and the regulatory regimes that govern them.  
This Article argues that quotas may serve to heighten the divide between Europe and 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States and Europe share a great deal in their economic 
governance.  As the two largest developed economies, the commonalities 
have become especially apparent even as other regions develop more 
rapidly.1  The move to adopt quotas for women on corporate boards, 
however, signals a departure from this harmonization of corporate 
governance.  France’s adoption of a quota for women on corporate boards 
reflects Europe’s increasingly stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate 
governance.  This approach recognizes that (1) shareholders, as simply the 
 
1 For a discussion on rapid economic growth in Asia, see Steven Globerman, Mike W. Peng & 
Daniel M. Shapiro, Corporate Governance and Asian Companies, 28 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 1 (2011). 
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owners of a corporation’s residual interests, are but one of many entities 
served by a corporation, and (2) corporate governance issues must be 
expanded to all stakeholders of a company (workers, creditors, and the 
environment).  The passage of Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on Equal 
Representation of Women and Men on Corporate Boards and on Equality 
in the Workplace, also known as the French Corporate Board Quota 
(FCBQ), has prompted changes in the composition of current corporate 
boards and a transformation in French corporate governance.2  France 
adopted the FCBQ after Norway passed a similar law in 2008.3  After the 
FCBQ, other European countries and regional institutions have begun 
viewing quotas as a legitimate and even necessary remedy, although their 
implementation has been far from homogeneous.  This corporate 
governance culture stands in sharp contrast with the shareholder 
governance found in the United States.  Feminization, in the literal sense of 
adding women participants to corporate leadership, augments the variety of 
perspectives.  It suggests that effective corporate governance relies on all 
stakeholders’ interests, rather than merely shareholders’ interest.   
This Article explores whether the addition of women board members 
does in fact “feminize” the corporation.. Professor Rosenblum’s work 
explores the effect of women’s presence on board governance more 
 
2 Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des 
hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité professionnelle [Law 
2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on Equal Representation of Women and Men on Corporate Boards and 
on Equality in the Workplace], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011, p. 1680. 
3 AAGOTH STORVIK & MARI TEIGEN, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, WOMEN ON BOARD: THE 
NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE 1, 4 (2010), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07309.pdf; Press 
Release, Regjeringen Stoltenberg II, Rules Regarding Gender Balance Within Boards of Public Limited 
Companies (Aug. 12, 2005), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/ 
2005/rules-regarding-gender-balance-within-bo.html?id=429993.  Section 6–11a of Norway’s Companies Act 
reads: 
 
On the board of directors of public limited liabilities companies, both sexes shall be 
represented in the following manner:  
1. If the board of directors has two or three members, both sexes shall be 
represented.   
2. If the board of directors has four or five members, each sex shall be represented 
by at least two.   
3. If the board of directors has six to eight members, each sex shall be represented 
by at least three.   
4. If the board of directors has nine members, each sex shall be represented by at 
least four, and if the board of directors has more members, each sex shall be 
represented by at least 40 percent.   
5. The rules in no. 1 to 4 apply correspondingly for elections of deputy directors. 
 
Lov om allmennaksjeselskaper [Public Limited Liability Companies Act] 19 des 2003 nr. 
120, § 6-11a (Nor.), translated in Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, 
SCHJØDT (Feb. 26, 2009). 
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specifically.4  This Article takes a broader view to comprehend the 
difference between Europe and the United States by presenting the 
constitutional and corporate governance backgrounds of each system.  
Further, the Article exposes some of the limits of the convergentist 
corporate governance theory.  Some scholars, notably Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman, have argued that national corporate governance 
mechanisms are on an inexorable path toward convergence, leading to the 
“end of history” for corporate law in which differences between nations 
eventually fade away.5  This Article demonstrates that some divergence has 
taken place across the Atlantic with regard to the shareholder/stakeholder 
divide, a divergence exacerbated by the adoption of corporate board quotas 
in France, Norway, and elsewhere. 
France’s recently adopted quota for women on corporate boards will 
likely alter French and perhaps European corporate governance.6  The 
quota will arguably lead to significantly more women-inclusive corporate 
boards, reflecting an unarticulated supposition that the corporate board is 
an appropriate site for regulating a social justice question such as sex 
equality.  This change accentuates the established stakeholder corporate 
culture widespread in Europe, as evidenced by the presence of worker 
representation on boards.  In contrast, the United States remains firmly 
oriented towards shareholder primacy. Recently, stock exchange, capital 
market, and corporate governance reforms have, to a considerable degree, 
 
4 See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55 
(2009).  In retrospect, to some extent that article somewhat naively advocated for the institution of 
quotas to improve women’s representation on corporate boards.  Forthcoming work will examine the 
impact of corporate board quotas on corporate governance itself.  See Darren Rosenblum & Daria 
Roithmayr, Sex Regimes and Corporate Governance (forthcoming). 
5 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 3 (Harvard Law 
Sch., Discussion Paper No. 280, 2000), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/ 
papers/No280.00.Hansmann-Kraakman.pdf (“[A]t the beginning of the twenty-first century we are 
witnessing rapid convergence on the standard shareholder-oriented model as a normative view of 
corporate structure and governance, and we should expect this normative convergence to produce 
substantial convergence as well in the practices of corporate governance and in corporate law.”). 
6 Representation of women on corporate boards varies widely by country.  See generally Julia J. 
Redenius-Hoevermann & Daniela Weber-Rey, La représentation des femmes dans les conseils 
d’administration et de surveillance en France et en Allemagne, 4 REVUE DES SOCIETES 203, 203–04 
(2011).  Important cultural factors explain this European disparity.  In Germany, where women 
traditionally have a weaker presence in professional environments, the idea of introducing quotas today 
seems unrealistic.  Moreover, this idea has been rejected by the German legislature, which has 
contented itself with incorporating the concept into the Corporate Governance Code.  For a precise and 
comprehensive study, see id.  In Europe today, barely one in six board members are female, with 
women representing only 4% of board chairpersons.  This average conceals great disparities in cultural 
traditions among Member States.  See Gender Balance in Decision-Making Positions, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making (last visited May 10, 2014) (“On 14 
November 2012 the European Commission proposed legislation with the aim of attaining a 40% 
objective of the under-represented sex in non-executive board-member positions in publicly listed 
companies, with the exception of small and medium enterprises.  The aim of this new legislation is to 
accelerate progress towards a better gender balance on the corporate boards of European companies.”).  
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been driven by the financial crisis and have made the European stakeholder 
approaches more common and popular.  Even if not intended as such, the 
FCBQ is part of this evolution. 
Each part of the Article contrasts both national and regional 
developments to depict the widening discrepancy between United States 
and European corporate governance cultures.  Part II briefly details the 
proliferation of quotas for women on corporate boards in the national and 
transnational European contexts.  It also frames the shift in France and the 
resistance in the United States within their respective constitutional 
traditions.  Part III explores the depth of the stakeholder/shareholder divide 
between those two societies, which are governed by vastly distinct public and 
private regimes.  Part IV explores the distinction between stakeholder or 
shareholder orientations of corporate governance in France and the United 
States.  For example, France has a long history of practical stakeholder 
participation.  The United States’ interest in stakeholder inclusion, in contrast, 
has remained an academic exercise.  Finally, Part V argues that FCBQs, both 
at the national and the European Union level, will strengthen the 
stakeholder orientation of European corporations and deepen the divide 
between European and United States corporate governance. 
A comparative project such as this poses several challenges.  Beyond 
the question of translation sits the incorporation of diverse legal literatures 
across societies, including constitutional and corporate law frameworks.7  
Describing and comparing two distinct legal cultures, each of which has its 
own multiplicities,8 raises particular comparative challenges that require a 
better understanding of each legal system.9  To meet those challenges, this 
study employs three distinct comparative methods: functionalism, 
contextualism, and discourse comparativism.10  It is a functionalist study in 
 
7 See Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 150–51 (1998) (citing UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 
97 (1997)); William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1889, 1965 (1995); Basil Markesinis, Comparative Law—A Subject in Search of an Audience, 
53 MOD. L. REV. 1, 21 (1990); Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era 
of Information, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 222 (1999); see also Paula Giliker, Book Review, 55 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 243, 243 (2006) (reviewing ESIN ÖRÜCÜ, THE ENIGMA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: 
VARIATIONS ON A THEME FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW (2005)). 
8 Although France’s corporate governance is unitary, U.S. and European corporate governance 
regulation have many parts that move in different ways.  For example, Delaware law and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission dominate in the United States.  Federalism is one form of multiplicity; 
others include language, legal pluralism, conflicting or coterminous court systems, and other differences 
that reflect the law’s complexity.  
9 See Riles, supra note 7, at 222; see also Giliker, supra note 7, at 243 (Örücü discusses the 
difficulties that academics and students encounter in undertaking comparative research).  Comparative 
law provides “a glimpse into the origins of legal norms; the prospect of a better understanding of the 
efficacy and limits of law; and the hope of insight into the connections among law, behavior, ideas, and 
power.”  Riles, supra note 7, at 238. 
10 Here, we rely largely on Annelise Riles’s categorization of the field, which provides both a 
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that it will describe the FCBQ’s impact and social function.11  At the same 
time, the study is contextual because it incorporates the law and its 
relationship to culture, as well as interdisciplinary knowledge.12  These 
explicit comparisons render each system more coherent than it would 
appear otherwise.13  Finally, the study uses comparative method to clarify 
the cultural divide separating the United States and European corporate 
governance. 
 
II.  MIXITÉ VERSUS DIVERSITY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMINGS 
 
France’s constitutional framework, which allowed the FCBQ, stands in 
stark contrast to that of the United States, which would not permit quotas. 
 
methodological and cultural distinction among these groups, recognizing the role that subjectivity plays 
in scholarly production.  Riles, supra note 7, at 231–51.  Fabio Morosini categorizes the methods of 
comparative law analysis in a different way, arguing that two different schools exist.  The first, which 
takes a convergence approach, focuses on the similarities between two or more legal systems.  Fabio 
Morosini, Globalization & Law: Beyond Traditional Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies and an 
Example from Private International Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 545 (2005).  The 
second, non-convergence approach, distinguishes different legal systems by looking at the differences 
between two or more legal systems.  Id. at 546; see also Pierre Legrand, Paradoxically, Derrida: For a 
Comparative Legal Studies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 665, 705 (2005) (arguing that comparatists refer 
to other legal studies of the law not because they do not know other methodologies, but because they do 
not want to know: “the desire not to know about otherness-in-the-law is not simple ignorance; rather, it 
assumes a prescience of what it is that one does not want to know . . . .”). 
11 Riles, supra note 7, at 232, 235; Morosini, supra note 10, at 546 (noting that some scholars argue 
for a comparative methodology based on the differences in the laws of countries, known as the non-
convergence approach).  As a defining comparative school, functionalists are accused by other 
comparativists of Eurocentrism and inappropriately loose comparisons.  See Riles, supra note 7, at 232, 
241. 
12 Riles, supra note 7, at 240–41; see also Horst Klaus Lücke, Statutory Interpretation: New 
Comparative Dimensions, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1023, 1026 (2005) (reviewing STEFAN VOGENAUER, 
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN ENGLAND AND ON THE CONTINENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
JUDICIAL JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS (2001)) (attempting to explain the 
difference between interpretations of the law in different countries, particularly in common law and 
civil law courts; Lücke utilizes culture to explain the divergence in interpretive methods).  See generally 
Günther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 
(1985) (Frankenberg argued early on that a critical focus was imperative for methodologically sound 
comparative work).  Literary theory and cultural studies provide insight into a legal text’s underlying 
meaning.  Id. 
13 Discourse scholars, in inquiring about their own legal traditions, address their subjectivity 
explicitly, in part to achieve more accuracy in the description of the “other” legal system.  The concept 
of otherness, typically arising in critical theory with regard to group difference, also arises in the 
comparative law context.  See Morosini, supra note 10, at 547.  This is in contrast to functionalist work.  
Discourse scholars criticize functionalist work for ignoring their subjectivity.  Descriptions of other 
legal cultures may consist of the scholar’s projection of her own perceptions onto the ostensible 
territory of study.  In this “epistemological imperialism,” the study better reflects the values of the 
observer rather than the observed.  Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 190 
(2002). 
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A.  France’s Corporate Board Quota and Its Impact 
 
1.  A Rigorous Quota 
 
On January 27, 2011, France’s legislature changed the French 
corporate landscape by passing Law 2011-103 on the equal representation 
of men and women on boards of directors and supervisory boards.14  This 
law established the principle that boards of directors and supervisory 
boards of private companies or joint-stock companies of any size, listed 
and unlisted, must strive for an equal representation of men and women.15 
 The legislature distinguished between private corporations and public 
sector businesses and established minimum percentages to be met and a 
schedule for attaining these objectives.  Three main categories of 
corporations face regulation: (1) private companies and joint-stock 
companies that issue shares admitted for trading on a regulated market; (2) 
French corporations that, for three consecutive fiscal years, satisfy certain 
criteria (employing at least 500 permanent staff members and producing an 
annual revenue or balance sheet total of at least €50 million); and (3) public 
institutions and certain businesses that are subject to the democratization 
rules of the public sector.  The law itself defines the aims of its legal 
framework, as well as the “broad outline” of gender equality policy.  It 
stipulates sanctions for companies that fail to respect the aims or broad 
outline imposed.  Further disclosure requirements would be superfluous.16 
 
14 See François Roche, Conseils d’administration: les femmes investissent le CAC 40, LA TRIBUNE 
(July 11, 2011), http://www.latribune.fr/actualites/economie/france/20110715trib000636534/conseils-d-
administration-les-femmes-investissent-le-cac-40.html; see also Benoit Marpeau,  La quasi-parité 
imposée au sein des conseils d’administration, LE CERCLE LES ECHOS (Feb. 21, 2011), 
http://lecercle.lesechos.fr/cercle-entrepreneur/juridique/221133475/quasi-parite-imposee-sein-conseils-
dadministration. 
15 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. L225-17, L225-69, L226-4 (Fr.).   
16 These provisions are completed by the operation of the “comply or explain” rule via the 
recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF Code.  Soft codification was introduced in France in the 1990s, 
driven by increasing globalization in the market capitalization of the major listed companies, and thus 
in response to the expectations of overseas investors.  Consequently, the principles of corporate 
governance were first introduced in France at the instigation of capital markets and it is manifestly in 
this area that the issues of soft law and self regulation have been most strongly at work over the last 
twenty years.  The stages in this process to formulate flexible corporate law are well known.  First, there 
was the July 1995 CNPF-AFEP report on the boards of directors of listed companies (Viénot I Report).  
Then came the December 1998 report on corporate governance (Viénot II Report), followed by the 
October 2003 AFEP-MEDEF report on the corporate governance of listed companies (Bouton Report).  
All of these reports were consolidated, at the instigation of Parliament, into a “Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies” by December 2008.  See infra note 17.  Strictly speaking, this code 
falls under the heading of soft law, insofar as companies may choose whether or not to adopt it.  The 
“comply or explain” rule requires only that companies choosing the latter option explain their reasons 
for not adopting the rules of good corporate governance proposed in the Code of Corporate 
Governance.  The AFEP-MEDEF Code is a private code of corporate governance, and it is the one most 
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Since 1995, several business groups have produced effective corporate 
governance codes to which listed companies may voluntarily refer.  These 
include Viénot Reports I and II, the Bouton Report, and the AFEP-MEDEF 
Report.17  Now the code of reference for companies issuing shares admitted 
to trading on a regulated market, the AFEP-MEDEF Code does not bind 
corporations.  However, European Community law obligates the chair of 
the board of directors (or supervisory board) to prepare a report on 
corporate governance, including whether the firm complies with the AFEP-
MEDEF Code.18  Non-compliance requires explanation.  The French 
Financial Markets Authority (AMF) then publishes an annual report that 
includes firms’ internal monitoring procedures.  The Code applies to listed 
firms but recommends that others adopt the rules as well.  In April 2010, 
the Code set certain parity objectives to be achieved progressively for 
women on boards of at least twenty percent female directors within three 
years and at least forty percent within six years.  The AFEP-MEDEF Code 
may also apply to companies outside the FCBQ’s scope.19 
Before the FCBQ bill’s presentation in 2009, only ten percent of the 
directors of French listed companies were female, and only five percent of 
new board members were women.20  At that point, only four publicly listed 
companies had reached the twenty-percent threshold.21  When the bill was 
 
French listed companies refer to.  The AFEP-MEDEF Code was drafted by the “Association française 
des entreprises privées” (AFEP) and the “Mouvement des entreprises françaises” (MEDEF), the two 
leading professional associations for private companies in France.  
17 All of these reports were combined in a code, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listing 
Companies.  See Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées, AFEP (June 2013), available 
at http://www.afep.com/uploads/medias/documents/Code_gouvernement_entreprise_societes_cotees_ 
sJuin_2013.pdf. 
18 See Council Regulation 384/96, of 22 December 1995 Protection Against Dumped Imports from 
Countries not Members of the European Community, 1995 O.J. (L 213); Commission Decision 
2008/649/EC, of 3 July 2008 regarding Council Regulation 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on Protection 
Against Dumped Imports from Countries not Members of the European Community, arts. 8–9, 2008 
O.J. (L 213); Directive 2006/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 
amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies 
83/349/EEC on Consolidated Accounts, 86/635/EEC on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated 
Accounts of Banks and Other Financial Institutions and 91/674/EEC on the Annual Accounts and 
Consolidated Accounts of Insurance Undertakings, art. 46a, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1, 4 (requiring 
companies that have securities trading in a market defined by Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC to 
provide a corporate governance report). 
19 Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des 
hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité professionnelle [Law 
2011-103 of January 27, 2011 for the Equal Representation of Men and Women on Boards of Directors 
and Supervisory Boards, and for Professional Equality], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011, p. 1680. 
20 See Roche, supra note 14; Institut Français des Administrateurs, Journée annuelle des 
administrateurs 2010: les nouvelles dynamiques du conseil, 21 ADMINISTRATEUR: LA LETTRE DE L’IFA 
1, 3 (2010); Veronique Morali, Les femmes dans les conseils d’administration, in LA GOUVERNANCE 
DES ENTREPRISES, CLÉ DE LA COMPÉTIVITÉ 24 n.409 (2011). 
21 Institut Français des Administrateurs, supra note 20. 
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introduced, nominations from general meetings in 2010 doubled this 
percentage: almost a third of new directors were women, and thirty percent 
of CAC 4022 companies had reached the FCBQ’s twenty percent 
intermediate level.23  In absolute terms, the number of female directors has 
risen from 60 to 119 in two years.24  This percentage remains low, 
however, for SBF80 companies, where only fifteen percent of directors are 
women.25  The spike in the number of women on corporate boards after the 
public discussion and eventual adoption of the FCBQ suggests that the 
bill’s introduction played a key role in this change.  Thus, a certain 
correlation may be inferred between the intervention of the legislature and 
the recent improvement seen in CAC 40 corporations in terms of gender 
equality.26 
Studies regarding the profile of female directors in France at the time 
of the quota’s adoption show that female directors are generally younger 
than their male colleagues (54.7 years old on average compared to 60.7 for 
men) and more likely to have international origins.27 That being said, this 
profile is shifting as many corporations take on new women directors—
anecdotal evidence confirms this shift.28  Many new female directors hold 
degrees in law or business management in contrast to the more technical 
education received by their male counterparts.  Male directors are most 
often graduates of the French Grandes Écoles.  Female directors also do 
not have the same experience at the top executive levels as male directors.29  
One may therefore infer a correlation between the feminization of boards of 
directors and some diversification of skills and points of view on how to 
run a business.  In practical terms, the participation of women on boards of 
directors should offer corporations a larger pool of skills and expertise than 
a pool composed exclusively of males.  A counterargument might assert 
that less executive experience may not constitute useful diverse 
experience.30  However, given the extraordinarily narrow band of French 
 
22 The CAC 40 is one of the main indices for listed companies, along with the SBF 120 and the 
SBF 80. 
23 Institut Français des Administrateurs, supra note 20, at 1, 3.   
24 Roche, supra note 14. 
25 Id. at 24. 
26 Id. 
27 OBSERVATOIRE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIÉTALE DES ENTREPRISES, L’ACCES ET LA 
REPRESENTATIVITE  DES FEMMES AUX ORGANES DE GOUVERNANCE D’ENTREPRISE (Sept. 2009),  availabile at 
http://www.orse.org/l_acces_et_la_representativite_des_femmes_aux_organes_de_gouvernance_d_entreprise-
52-8.html.   
28 Valérie Lion, Conseils d’administration: ces femmes qui cumulent, L’EXPRESS, May 16, 2012, at 
74. 
29 Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance 
and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 294 (2009). 
30 Indeed, one study on the lower experience among women on boards in Norway after their 
adoption of a corporate board quota correlates this with lower returns on equity.  See generally Kenneth 
R. Ahern and Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of 
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society that occupies corporate board positions, diversification may bring 
new market knowledge.31 
 
2.  Was the FCBQ the Right Way to Impose Quotas in 
Boardrooms? 
 
Despite these advances, the law has not escaped controversy.  Experts 
have notably raised three issues.  First, the gradual implementation of the 
law is not easy to interpret, and the interpretation has raised considerable 
debate.32  Second, the sanction of suspending directors’ fees, which is 
generally the response to absenteeism or misconduct, is not well suited for 
violations of a legal rule on quotas.33  Third, there are concerns that the 
aims of the law may not be attainable.  Admittedly, the law’s restrictive 
requirements may lead to a mechanical application, to the point of adhering 
to quotas to the detriment of skills.  Indeed, reliable estimates suggest that 
the demand for new female directors is close to one thousand.34  The targets 
will be even harder to reach if authorities implement a proposal to reduce 
the number of concurrently held mandates to less than five. 
Furthermore, the violation of the quota, which some anticipate to be 
particularly problematic in the case of smaller businesses, and the double 
punishment that would follow, raises the fear that it may increase the 
liability of directors in the future.35  Although strong feminization of higher 
education may facilitate filling these positions over the long term, the 
consistent exclusion of women from executive positions will continue to 
make it difficult to fill the directorships in the near term.  In addition, 
reducing the number of concurrently held mandates would logically lead to 
greater diversity in the supply of directors.  Unless they also come to hold 
several directorships,36 the naming of more female directors may well lead 
 
Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q. J. ECON. 137 (2012). 
31 Of course, the presumption here is that diversity does lead to value, an assertion that requires 
further demonstration.  Scott Page’s work on diversity provides substantial material on the productivity 
of diversity.  See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY 
CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007).   
32 See generally ASSOCIATION NATIONALE DES SOCIÉTÉS PAR ACTIONS, JOURNÉE D’ÉTUDE DE 
L’ANSA (2011). 
33 The law establishes two types of sanctions: (1) the nullification of nominations made in violation 
of gender equality rules, and (2) for private listed and large companies only, the more original but not 
necessarily effective measure of suspending directors’ fees for all directors concerned, where the law 
has been violated.  CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. L225-45, L225-83 (Fr.).  For a critique, see 
Jean-François Barbiéri, Parité sexuelle obligatoire dans la composition des conseils: le problème des 
sanctions, 5 JOLY MENSUAL D’INFORMATION DES SOCIÉTÉS 508, 508 (2010); Chantal Jordan, Vers une 
représentation équilibrée dans les conseils d’administration et de surveillance, REVUE LAMY DROIT 
DES AFFAIRES, May 2011, at 3462. 
34 Morali, supra note 20, at 24. 
35 Id. 
36 Only two female directors hold at least three directorships concurrently. 
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to greater support for a strict rule concerning the concurrent holding of 
mandates.  Whether or not multiple directorships affect efficacy is an open 
question, but it is clear that board-nominating committees prefer candidates 
who can focus on their particular corporate context. 
 
B.  The Comparative Ease of French Constitutional Modification 
 
French legal culture permitted the FCBQ’s adoption.  France permits 
the revision of its Constitution through simple legislative approval, unlike 
the United States, which requires a legislative supermajority followed by a 
supermajority in each of the legislatures of a supermajority of states.  The 
contrast is marked—the United States Constitution remains a largely 18th 
century document,37 while France’s Constitution changes on a regular 
basis.  The distinct approaches to constitutional reform reflect an equally 
profound contrast between the centrality of jurisprudence in common law 
jurisdictions and legislation in civil law jurisdictions.  Federalism also 
plays a role—the relevant jurisdiction for the adoption of such corporate 
regulation in the United States would be Delaware, where a majority of the 
country’s largest corporations are registered, or in federal securities law.38  
The adoption of a CBQ in Delaware would raise both state and federal 
constitutional questions with surely unpromising results.39 
The most direct precedent for the FCBQ is the passage of Parity in 
2000.40  Parity required that political parties name women as half of all 
candidates for public office.  This occurred as the result of a long 
movement for women’s suffrage and electoral equality.41  After a series of 
feminist movements related to the right to vote and political 
representation,42 a second movement to institute some quotas starting after 
the Socialist Party victory of 1981 obtained limited success.  However, the 
 
37 A point most eloquently made by Hannah Arendt.  See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 202 
(1963) (“Thus the amendments to the Constitution augment and increase the original foundations of the 
American republic.”). 
38 Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty, 42 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 61, 77–78 (2009). 
39 Although France has some regions, the law is uniform throughout the country, and most 
European states are not federal.  
40 See JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, PARITE!: SEXUAL EQUALITY AND THE CRISIS OF FRENCH 
UNIVERSALISM (2005); Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the 
Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2005). 
41 See Rosenblum, supra note 40; SCOTT, supra note 40. 
42 Despite ceaseless efforts to attain suffrage, French men represented women in their household for 
sixty years after Auclert’s declaration, far longer than in most other democracies.  See FRANÇOISE 
GASPARD ET AL., AU POUVOIR, CITOYENNES! LIBERTÉ, ÉGALITÉ, PARITÉ! 102 (1992).  During the First 
World War, one politician proposed unsuccessfully that widows should vote because the men through 
whom they were represented could no longer do so.  Id. at 103–04.  It was only after Vichy’s collapse in 
1944 that French women obtained the vote, well after the Nineteenth Amendment’s passage in the 
United States.  Id. at 21. 
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Conseil Constitutionnel—the French equivalent to the U.S. Supreme 
Court—later struck down the legislation.43  Parity advocates reshaped their 
agenda around the notion of a gendered vision of humanity, composed of 
two sexes, in order to address these constitutional concerns.44  Confronting 
potential victory, Parity advocates began to consider the concerns in the 
Conseil Constitutionnel’s 1982 decision, shifting their focus from 
guaranteeing legislative seats to requiring parties to guarantee half their 
candidacies.45 
During the 1990s, Parity advocates built on historical, political, and 
philosophical arguments for women’s representation.46  Imposing quotas on 
political parties rather than the legislature itself would permit voters to 
express their political ideology and increase women’s participation.47  
Françoise Gaspard and a broad movement of left-identified feminists 
successfully reframed the debate, ultimately allowing Parity to become law 
in 2000.48  Additionally, Parity was seen as a cure for a crisis of 
 
43 This version was overturned by the Conseil Constitutionnel in a 1982 ruling.  The Conseil 
Constitutionnel favors the notion of formal equality over equality of chances with the law.  Decision 34, 
Feminine Quotas, denied the proposed amendment to modify election rules requiring at least 25% of 
the candidates on the list to be women.  The Conseil believed that a “text that reserved a certain number 
of places for women . . . without doing the same for men . . . would be contrary to the principle of 
equality.”  Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] décision No. 82-146, Nov. 18, 1982 
(Fr.).  However, voluntary commitments to women’s representation arose among left-wing political 
parties throughout the 1980s.  As a strategic move, in 1975 Françoise Giroud, Secretary for Women’s 
Condition, introduced 100 measures for women, including a bill limiting the candidates on a list to 80% 
for either of the two sexes.  Original language reserved 20% for women, but this language was removed 
at the advice of attorneys concerned about such a quota.  Four years later, the Minister for Family and 
Women’s Conditions proposed a 20% minimum for towns with populations above 2,500.  GILL 
ALLWOOD & KHURSHEED WADIA, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN FRANCE 1958-2000 192 (2000); GASPARD 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 136–37.  Although the Assembly approved the bill, the session ended before 
the Senate could debate it.  
44 See Rosenblum, supra note 40; SCOTT, supra note 40. 
45 See Rosenblum, supra note 40. 
46 Parity advocates claimed that women were being subjected to the rule of men: “The monopolization of 
power by a group, by a clique, as well as by a sex is a usurpation.”  GASPARD ET AL., supra note 42, at 181.  
Another important point was Mariette Sineau’s critique of France’s “Monosexual Democracy.”  The 
“maleness” of the political class, Parity advocates argued, constituted a “monosexual” democracy in which 
men acquire political power early in their lives, often based on social position and family.  See MARIETTE 
SINEAU, PROFESSION FEMME POLITIQUE: SEXE ET POUVOIR SOUS LA CINQUIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE 240 (2001). 
47 ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 43, at 211.  
48 GASPARD ET AL., supra note 42.  In the early 1990s, Parity began to gain momentum.  See 
Isabelle Giraud & Jane Jenson, Constitutionalizing Equal Access: High Hopes, Dashed Hopes?, in HAS 
LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED 
STATES 73 (Sytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 2001).  In March 1992, a roundtable meeting was 
organized to serve as a “network for Parity.”  CLAUDE DE GRANRUT, ALLEZ LES FEMMES!: LA PARITÉ 
EN POLITIQUE 34 (2002).  Months later, in Au Pouvoir, Citoyennes! (To Power, Women Citizens!), 
Françoise Gaspard argued that the Revolution, the suffrage movement, and the postwar period all failed 
to address the issue of outcome-based women’s participation in elected bodies.  See GASPARD ET AL., 
supra note 42.  Le Monde’s publication of the “Manifesto of 577 for Paritary Democracy” placed Parity 
on the national stage, winning the endorsement of the left and the continued inattention of the right, 
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democracy—a method to legitimize the state.49  The final version of the 
law amended the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958 and provided 
for legislation that would implement the constitutional changes.50  Parity’s 
implementation has been met with marked success in some elections and 
more modest advances in others.  It continues to be the subject of much 
debate.51 
Like Parity, the FCBQ was initially deemed unconstitutional, and the 
constitutional prohibition was overcome by legislative action.  In both 
cases, the objective of sex equality played a central role.  It is worth noting, 
however, that the FCBQ originated from a conservative government, 
whereas Parity arose out of a progressive bloc.  This fact proves surprising 
for those who view the measure as a feminist move.  It is a view rarely 
taken by political conservatives.  However, the utilitarian business 
justification of the law reflects its conservative origins. 
The constitutional framework in France allowed for a constitutional 
legitimacy for mixité, or the inclusion of people of both sexes.  Preceding 
the publication of the FCBQ, many scholars debated constitutional issues 
and some argued that a law introducing quotas was prohibited because the 
constitutional principle of Republican equality prohibits positive 
discrimination.52  In addition, under French traditional jurisprudence, the 
prohibition of quotas was specifically applied to private companies.  The 
Conseil Constitutionnel decided that “the Constitution does not allow that 
 
apart from Simone Veil.  Legislators proposed a version of progressive but non-mandatory Parity.  
Leading male politicians came out in favor of Parity, including two candidates in the 1995 Presidential 
race.  See generally ÉLÉONORE LÉPINARD, L’ÉGALITÉ INTROUVABLE: LA PARITÉ, LES FÉMINISTES ET LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE (2007). 
49 Rosenblum, supra note 40; ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 43, at 213 (“The main indicators of 
this crisis included the growing gap between the concerns of the French people and the political elite, 
repeatedly demonstrated by public opinion polls; rising abstention rates; the failure of the parties to 
recruit new members; and public disaffection with a political class in which scandals seemed 
endemic.”); SINEAU, supra note 46, at 246 (“The debate on Parity only served to restart the question of 
the renewal of democracy by women.”).  
50 The constitutional revision took place in 1999.  Law Number 99–569 of July 8, 1999 modified 
Articles 1 through 4 of the Constitution of October 4, 1958.  Title I of Law Number 2000–493 of June 
6, 2000 basically requires that in France’s semi-proportional system, municipal, regional, European, and 
some senatorial elections use party slates, while others, notably National Assembly elections, require 
voters to select a particular candidate.  In a list-proportional election, instituting Parity appeared 
relatively simple—every other name had to correspond to the “other” sex.  Should a party fail to present 
candidates of alternating gender, the prefecture would refuse to present the list on the ballot.  Parties 
were required to name women to half their candidacies or lose the ability to field any candidates at all.  
See generally LÉPINARD, supra note 48. 
51 For an authoritative discussion of Parity, see LÉPINARD, supra note 48.  It is worthwhile to 
contrast this work with one executed at the time of Parity’s passage.  See JANINE MOSSUZ-LAVAU, 
Femmes et pouvoir en Europe méridionale en l’an 2000, in RAPPORT NATIONAL FRANÇAIS 43 (2000) 
(noting elections by list where three or fewer candidates appear to also avoid Parity rules). 
52 Anne-Marie Le Pourhiet, Pour une analyse critique de la discrimination positive, 114 LE DÉBAT 
166 (2001). 
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the composition of directory or supervisory boards in private and public 
companies should be regulated by strict rules based on sex quotas.”53  This 
decision was interpreted as rejecting quotas as a whole and, specifically, on 
boards of directors.  Accordingly, the Constitution had to be amended 
before the FCBQ was passed.  The amendment, Law 2008-724 of July 23, 
2008, modified Article 1 of the French Constitution.54  According to the 
new constitutional rule, “the law favors the equal access to elective 
mandates and positions for women and men, as well as to professional and 
social responsibilities.”55  Thus, the new constitutional law made quotas 
possible in two main sectors: politics and management.  Amending the 
Constitution to accommodate corporate board quotas highlights the relative 
fluidity of the French Constitution. 
 
C.  U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence Has Rejected Quotas 
 
While French constitutional law now permits a focus on mixité, thus 
far it rejects any recognition of broader diversity in legal remedies for 
inequality.  Beyond the common law–civil law divide, quotas underscore a 
particularly interesting contrast between the French and U.S. constitutional 
frameworks.  In the United States, courts have consistently rejected quotas, 
as have thinkers across the ideological spectrum.56  Even supporters of 
affirmative action have distinguished incremental affirmative action 
programs from quotas, which have been characterized as malignant, 
unjustifiable, and inherently wrong.57  Although affirmative action may be 
called a quota in other contexts, quotas, at least those labeled as such, are 
pariahs. 
 
1.  Quotas Examined Through the U.S. Constitutional Process 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected quotas, even as it has affirmed 
the appropriate inclusion of discrete remedies for past discrimination.  U.S. 
jurisprudence has rejected quotas specifically with regard to race-related 
affirmative action in higher education.  The seminal case, Regents of the 
 
53 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2006-533DC, Mar. 16, 2006, 
Rec. 39 (Fr.).  See also Julie Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to 
Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449 (2012). 
54 Loi 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve République (1) [Law 
2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the Modernization of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic (1)], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 23, 2008, p. 
11890. 
55 Id. 
56 See Rosenblum, supra note 40, at 1133–36. 
57 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Symposium on Race Consciousness and Legal Scholarship: Defending the 
Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1067 
(1992). 
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University of California v. Bakke, differentiated affirmative action (which it 
held was permissible within specific confines) from a quota, which it ruled 
was impermissible.58  In considering the legitimacy of a remedy, the U.S. 
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny as it had in previous race cases.  To 
survive this highest level of scrutiny, the law in question must involve a 
compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.  Laws or regulations involving gender are examined under the 
lower, intermediate scrutiny standard.  In Bakke, the Court considered a 
challenge to the University of California’s special-admission program that 
reserved 16 out of 100 placements for minority students.59  The Court 
found that the goal of assuring specified numerical representation of a 
specific group was facially invalid as a form of race discrimination.60  It 
held that race can be a factor in making determinations but cannot be the 
sole factor in excluding a certain group.61 
This same reasoning would apply in the gender context.  Were a 
jurisdiction in the United States to adopt a law similar to the FCBQ, it 
would undoubtedly run afoul of the very principles articulated in Bakke that 
have remained controlling in subsequent affirmative action cases.  In 
particular, like Bakke, a CBQ reserves spots for a specific group—it does 
not make gender one factor among many, but rather makes gender the only 
qualifying trait for compliance with the quota.  If a federal court were to 
analyze a statute such as the CBQ, it would follow the intermediate 
scrutiny standard in which classifications must further a substantial 
governmental interest and be tailored to fit that interest.  The court could 
not “rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”62  As in Bakke, gender 
could be a factor among several in developing programs to benefit women, 
but a numerical quota that can be filled only by women would be 
prohibited.  Subsequent case law has only further limited the application of 
affirmative action authorized in Bakke.63  Advocates for such a quota would 
have to articulate the state interest in workplace diversity, but even under 
this standard, it would only apply to state-funded organizations.  The 
 




62 Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, What Constitutes Reverse Sex or Gender Discrimination Against 
Males Violative of Federal Constitution or Statutes—Nonemployment Cases, 166 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2000). 
63 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying a strict scrutiny standard to decide 
whether the consideration of an applicant’s race as part of the University of Michigan Law School’s 
admissions process was constitutionally permissible and holding that consideration of race in the 
admission process is constitutional so long as it is used as one factor among many in an individualized 
process); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (utilizing the strict scrutiny standard, the 
Court disallowed the University of Michigan’s admissions policy in allotting points in the admission 
process to minorities on the sole basis of their minority classification). 
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alternative would be that such a quota would redress past discrimination, 
but the evidence would have to be extremely persuasive. 
One of the most prominent ways in which the United States has 
addressed gender inequality is through Title IX, which prohibits sex 
discrimination in the education context.64  Title IX requires institutions to 
ensure that university sports funding is substantially proportionate to the 
respective enrollments of male and female students.  If one sex has been 
underrepresented, the program should effectively include the 
underrepresented sex.  Although the U.S. Congress clearly did not intend 
Title IX to be a quota, closer examination of Title IX’s provisions reveals 
its quota-like aspects, as it compares opportunities by gender and only 
allows limited disparities.  Like the FCBQ and Parity, Title IX achieves 
adjustments in gender inequality with wide-ranging effects. 
Despite Title IX’s quota-like enforcement method, quota-phobia 
dominated the debate surrounding it.  One sponsor asserted that, “we are 
striking down quotas.  The thrust . . . is to do away with every quota.”65  As 
one critic alleged, “[A] system that requires a certain number of persons to 
be granted an opportunity based solely on one characteristic—such as 
sex—without regard for other qualifications—such as ability—is a ‘quota 
system’ in every sense of the words.”66  This antipathy towards quotas 
continues today, as it mirrors the fundamental reluctance to grapple with 
structural power differentials and group rights.  Title IX’s mechanism 
extended benefits based on the gender ratio of the student body, rather than 
 
64 The statute states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).  A relevant 
comparison to Title IX is Norway’s CBQ and the French Parity law.  See generally Darren Rosenblum, 
Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873 
(2008).  In contrast to both the CBQ and Parity, Title IX relies on the entirely distinct methodology of 
requiring substantial proportionality to reduce or eliminate gender-related harm in education.  Congress 
passed Title IX in 1972 to extend the protections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to federally funded 
educational institutions on the basis of sex.  The statute states that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).  Title IX’s first compliance option requires substantially proportionate 
opportunities, a standard that functions much like a quota.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit affirmed the validity of the substantial proportionality test in Cohen v. Brown University, 991 
F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).  Despite subsequent limitations, critics allege that substantial proportionality 
remains the only possible compliance option for many institutions.  Title IX’s proportionality 
requirement reflects an underlying redistributive response to gender inequality: the use of a quota 
system. 
65 Donald Mahoney, Taking a Shot at the Tile: A Critical Review of Judicial and Administrative 
Interpretations of Title IX as Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 27 CONN. L. REV. 943, 946 
(1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 30,409 (1971)). 
66 Id. at 944.  Senator Daryl Beall noted that a gender quota could result in reverse discrimination 
against others: “As we eliminate [sex discrimination in education], I hope that we are not establishing 
still another form of bias.”  Id. at 948 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5813 (1972)). 
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that of the broader national population, in a way that seems designed to 
avoid appearances of a quota.  At the time Title IX was passed, the 
majority of students were men,67 and Congress’s remedy aided women, but 
only in relation to their student body population.68    
In addition, quotas arouse disdain from the political-right and 
political-left.  A laissez-faire framework would view quotas as an intrusion 
into the private sector and a subversion of private interests.69  One 
economic analysis, that of Gary Becker, would likely assert that, if it were 
more efficient to have women on boards, absent market failure, competitive 
corporations would already include them.70  Liberal rejection of quotas may 
focus on several arguments, including that quotas violate the neutrality of 
constitutional doctrine,71 according to which a benefit to a particular group 
would inappropriately disfavor others.  Notably, “Classical democratic 
liberal theory was preoccupied enough with issues of extending equality 
that it rarely discussed difference.”72  The presumption is that, as a 
fundamental matter, no group should be treated any better than another 
group.  The normative question is whether one group should benefit and 
 
67 See Richard W. Riley, Introduction, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (June 10, 1997), http://www2.ed.gov/ 
pubs/TitleIX/part1.html; see also Iram Valentin, Title IX: A Brief History, 2 HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 123, 130 (1997). 
68 See Rosenblum, supra note 64, at 2883. 
69 Here, we presume what a law and economics scholar would find, given that there are no direct 
commentaries as of yet on corporate board quotas.  The three central precepts of law and economics 
theory are rational choice, wealth maximization or efficiency, and faith in markets.  Anita Bernstein, 
Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303, 308–15 (2005).  Richard Posner 
declares that a “man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003).  Furthermore, “The only kind of preference that counts in a system 
of wealth maximization is thus one that is backed up by money⎯in other words, that is registered in a 
market.”  Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 
(1979).  Thus, it is the existence of a market that creates a venue to make efficiency or wealth 
maximization possible.  Accordingly, for the law and economics traditionalist, gender quotas would 
undermine the market, the system of wealth maximization, and the framework by which men rationally 
maximize their own interests in life. 
70 See generally GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).  
71 Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, 
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992).  “Neutrality,” as predominantly defined, is 
believed to be of natural origin and therefore just.  Id.  Sunstein, however, finds this “baseline” belief 
incorrect because the notion of what is neutral is instead a culmination of old biases and stereotypes.  
Id. at 3–4.  The notion of “equality” cannot be detached from references to old values and distributions 
because the concept is dependent upon how the government normally ensures “equality” rather than 
how it should be accomplished.  Id. at 6–9.  Sunstein argues that the baseline for determining what is 
neutral arises from what is considered “natural,” and what is natural originates in what the government 
normally does.  In order to make change, the baseline of neutrality, in a constitutional context, must be 
adjusted through a substantive debate that is not reliant upon what is considered “natural.”  Id. at 13.  
72 Charles S. Maier & Sytte Klausen, Introduction, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING 
EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 3, 5, 19 (Sytte Klausen & Charles S. 
Maier eds., 2001). 
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whether such a benefit would necessarily disadvantage other groups.73  
Even if a nation determines that a particular group should benefit, how it 
makes this determination involves a different question.  Another liberal 
concern is that ideas, rather than identity, should determine representation, 
reflecting “a general reluctance to mandate equality (or proportionality) of 
outcomes rather than alleged equality of opportunity.”74 
Liberal and critical thinkers usually clash on a wide range of issues.75  
However, critical thinkers agree with liberals in rejecting quotas.  They 
argue that no such thing as neutrality exists.  Quotas further essentialist 
notions of identity, as there is an assumption that women are better 
equipped to represent women and that black representatives better represent 
black people.76  Thus, critical theorists reject quotas because they foster 
essentialist notions of identity.  Feminist theorists also reject essentialist 
arguments that imply “that any woman may represent women generally, 
regardless of social differences.”77  Anti-essentialist feminism holds that no 
essential notion of ‘womanhood’ exists.78  In short, no substantial legal 
academic movement has arisen to support or defend the legitimacy of 
quotas in any regard. 
Simply stated, U.S. jurisprudence and commentary roundly reject 
quotas as an unconstitutional violation of the most basic American social 
tenets.  Even as the United States permits affirmative action in racial 
contexts, arousing French disdain for “communitarianism,” it rejects quotas 
in race and gender contexts.79  France, in contrast, directly authorizes 
quotas in the gender context.  However, under its policy of laïcité, France 
refuses to even permit the public collection of data about racial, ethnic, and 
 
73 This argument arose in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), in which white voters sued to 
overturn a majority-minority district. 
74 Maier & Klausen, supra note 72, at 4.  
75 For example, the central assumption of critical race theorists is “that American society and its 
institutions, including its legal institutions, are fundamentally racist, and that racism is not a deviation 
from the normal operation of American society.”  Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed 
Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 2, 3 (Dorothy A. Brown ed., 2003). 
76 Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral 
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1102–03 (1991) (“Authentic black representation, or ‘descriptive’ 
representation, is the first important building block for black electoral success theory.  Authenticity refers to 
community-based and culturally rooted leadership.  The concept also distinguishes between minority-
sponsored and white-sponsored black candidates.  Basically, authentic representation describes the 
psychological value of black representation.  The term is suggestive of the essentialist impulse in black 
political participation: because black officials are black, they are representative.  Thus, authenticity reflects the 
importance of race in defining the character of black political participation.”).  
77 Jane Mansbridge, The Descriptive Political Representation of Gender: An Anti-Essentialist 
Argument, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND 
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 72, at 19. 
78 See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 
149 (1999). 
79 Rosenblum, supra note 64.   
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religious minorities.80  The flexibility in the French constitutional structure 
permits experimentation and shifting in perspectives on questions such as 
quotas.  Although clearly in violation of basic principles of equality 
enshrined in the French Constitution and in French history, the facilitating 
amendments of both Parity and the FCBQ illustrate the malleability of 
French equality traditions and the judiciary’s subordination to the 
legislature. 
The FCBQ stands as an example of the vast legal cultural difference 
between the United States and France surrounding the treatment of 
difference and remedies to combat discrimination.  Although the 
constitutional framework of the two countries provokes compelling 
debates, the next part of this Article examines their impact on corporate 
governance—in particular, the debate over whether corporations should be 
governed for the benefit of shareholders or stakeholders. 
 
III.  GOVERNANCE: STAKEHOLDERS OR SHAREHOLDERS 
 
France has an extensive history of public participation in private 
corporate governance, while U.S. law enshrines principles of freedom of 
contract and property.  Recently, this distinction has been emphasized in 
the debate over shareholder and stakeholder primacy.  Under shareholder 
primacy, the corporation’s goal is to benefit shareholders.81  This system, 
which has strengthened over the past few decades,82 has reached its apogee 
in the United States as regulators and companies adopt provisions to give 
shareholders a “say” on everything from corporate policy to executive 
compensation.  In contrast, a stakeholder focus recognizes that shareholders, 
as simply the owners of a corporation’s residual interests, are but one of 
many entities the corporation exists to serve, and none of these interests is 
primary.  From a contractual standpoint, the rights of bondholders and 
other creditors come before that of shareholders.  Conversely, stakeholder 
governance reflects the complex link between corporate decision-making 
and broader societal welfare, including workers, customers, communities, 
and even governments.83 
The stakeholder/shareholder debate falls along the lines of a clear and 
 
80 Rosenblum, supra note 40.  
81 See generally Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002). 
82 See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 909, 915–16 (2013) (noting that U.S. corporate governance “from the 1930s to the 
1970s . . . was characterized by what is often called ‘managerial capitalism’”).  For an example of 
“managerial capitalism” during this time period, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (discussing that under this theory, the 
board of directors balances interests of various stakeholders). 
83 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8–9 (2001). 
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central geographic divide.  While corporate governance in the United States 
rests on shareholder primacy, stakeholder governance is much more 
commonplace in Europe; it is even part of the regulatory scheme in many 
countries.84  For example, several European countries require union 
representation on the board of directors.85  This part of the Article 
articulates the distinction between shareholder and stakeholder visions, and 
demonstrates how this phenomenon exposes a transatlantic disharmony. 
According to stakeholder theory, a corporation’s primary purpose is to 
pursue strategies that advance the interests of stakeholders, which include 
groups and individuals affected by the corporation.86  Whereas a 
shareholder firm has improving investment returns for shareholders as its 
central goal, a stakeholder firm takes into account the multiple objectives 
involved with the various interests who have a “stake” in the corporation’s 
endeavors.87  Examples of stakeholders include workers, customers, 
communities where the corporation is located, and even governments for 
those same communities.88  Stakeholder theory may reflect underlying 
 
84 Franklin Allen et al., Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value (Eur. 
Corp. Gov’t Inst., Working Paper No. 190, 2009) (analyzing how legal frameworks ensure stakeholder 
orientation and how this focus affects competition).  
85 See L. Fulton, Worker Representation in Europe, ETUI, http://www.worker-participation.eu/ 
National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representation2 (last visited May 11, 2014). 
86 R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., COMPANY STAKEHOLDER RESPONSIBILITY: A NEW APPROACH TO 
CSR 10 (2005)  The authors find that CSR has outlived its usefulness because it promotes the 
separation theses—the idea that business issues and social issues can be dealt with separately—and 
focuses on corporations.  They also contend that CSR should be replaced with “company stakeholder 
responsibility,” which takes into consideration the intertwined nature of economic, political, social, and 
ethical issues.  See also Sylvia Ayuso et al., Maximizing Stakeholders’ Interests: An Empirical Analysis 
of the Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance (U. of Navarra, IESE Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 670, 2007).  The authors analyze function at board level, board diversity, and stakeholder 
engagement.  They frame their discussion on a stakeholder model of corporate governance within the 
perspective of the sustainable and responsible firm whose economic survival depends on its ability to 
satisfy the needs of its various stakeholders.  They conclude that there is evidence that CSR 
responsibility on the board is positively associated with indicators for dealing with primary and 
secondary stakeholders but not with a more diverse representation on the board.  However, board 
diversity had a positive impact on firm profitability, similar to stakeholder engagement.  See also Silvia 
Ayuso & Antonio Argandoña, Responsible Corporate Governance: Towards a Stakeholder Board of 
Directors?, 6 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 9 (2009).  Ayuso and Argandoña analyze the arguments 
given by different theoretical approaches for linking specific board composition with financial 
performance and CSR, and discuss the empirical research conducted.  Despite inconclusive findings, 
they argue that diverse stakeholders on the board will promote CSR activities of the firm, but it will also 
increase board capital—which could ultimately lead to better financial performance. 
87 Gerard Charreaux, Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Value Versus Shareholder Value, 5 J. 
MGMT. GOV’T 107 (2001) (“Unsatisfied with the dominating shareholders’ point of view . . . we 
propose an enlarged definition of the value which may be called the stakeholder value.”).  
88 See generally Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).  General 
Motors sought tax relief from the town of Ypsilanti in order to make improvements at its Willow Run factory.  
At a public hearing the plant manager Williams stated that “upon completion of this project and favorable 
market demand, it will allow Willow Run to continue production and maintain continuous employment for our 
employees.”  Id. at 561.  General Motors later decided to move its production to another region of the country 
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ethical norms, but it might also be to the corporation’s ultimate financial 
benefit.89  It may even link to some developments in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), also known as socially responsible investing (SRI) in 
Europe.90 
When evaluating corporate management, it becomes clear that 
strategies have direct consequences on stakeholders.91  Managing a 
corporation with stakeholders in mind requires executives to “formulate 
and implement processes which satisfy all and only those groups who have 
 
and Ypsilanti sued for an injunction.  The court held that GM was not liable under the theory of promissory 
estoppel because the fact that a corporation solicits tax abatements and persuades a municipality to grant them 
with assurances of jobs is not evidence of a promise. 
89 Some argue that a stakeholder focus is not necessarily solely an ethical issue.  In particular, one 
might argue that the firm can maximize its wealth through a focus on the variety of a firm’s 
engagements, including human capital.  See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder 
Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 136, 152 (2009) (reasoning that a commitment to stakeholders has an 
economic purpose rather than reflecting ethical norms).  Professor Gelter also suggests that although 
U.S. corporate governance follows a model that is closer to the team production theory asserted by Blair 
and Stout, continental Europe has more formal legal mechanisms such as codetermination and pro-
employee labor law.  Id. at 142, 148–54, 155–68.  See also Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose 
in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 585, 639–41 (2010) (noting that U.K. 
corporate governance, as compared to U.S. corporate governance, has more of a focus on shareholder 
interest because, in the takeover context, health care is not linked to employment status). 
90 Elaine Sternberg, for example, argues that stakeholder theory, while it reflects some ethical 
considerations, does not go far enough.  See generally Elaine Sternberg, The Stakeholder Concept: A 
Mistaken Doctrine, 4 FOUND. BUS. RESP. (1999).  Sternberg argues that a stakeholder theory that asserts 
organizations must be held accountable to their stakeholders is misguided and incapable of providing 
better corporate governance, business performance, or business conduct.  She argues that a better model 
of business ethics and social responsibility is the author’s Ethical Decision Model.  Social responsibility 
is not a responsibility to stakeholders, but a responsibility of stakeholders.  It consists of the strategic 
bestowal or withholding of support for social and economic institutions on the basis of stakeholder 
values.  Id.  For a discussion of the relationship between stakeholder firms and CSR, see Lorenzo 
Sacconi, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of “Extended” Corporate Governance: An 
Explanation Based on the Economic Theories of Social Contract, Reputation and Reciprocal 
Conformism, 142 LIUC PAPERS IN LAW, ETHICS & ECON. 1 (2005)  (Corporate social responsibility can 
be defined as a form of governance that extends the concept of fiduciary duty from a mono-stakeholder 
setting—where the relevant stakeholder is the owner—to one where the firm owes fiduciary duties to all 
its stakeholders—the owners included.  For CSR to be widely accepted and successful, it needs a body 
that promotes social dialogue that creates broad consensus on standards and promotes independent 
verification of compliance with these standards.  It also needs a body that will disseminate necessary 
information to the public and stakeholders so they can make informed decisions about which 
organizations to support.  These multi-stakeholder bodies would be made up of business associations—
for-profit, cooperatives, and non-profit—and representatives of principal stakeholders—trade unions, 
consumers, environmental associations, local authorities, etc.).  For additional discussion of CSR and 
stakeholder theory, see Leonardo Becchetti et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder’s 
Value: An Empirical Analysis (Bank of Fin. Research, Discussion Paper 1, 2009) (investigating the 
impact and relevance of CSR to the capital market and tracing market reactions to corporate entry into 
and exit from the Domini 400 Social Index—a recognized CSR benchmark). 
91 See generally R. Edward Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic 
Management (Darden Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 01-02, 2001). 
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a stake in the business.  The central task in this process is to manage and 
integrate the relationships and interests of shareholders, employees, 
customers, suppliers, communities and other groups in a way that ensures 
the long-term success of the firm.”92  Shareholder firms, in contrast, focus 
on “value maximization”—investment gain for shareholders, who may be 
focused on short-term gains.93 
As persuasive as stakeholder theory may appear, several critics 
question whether its fuzzy definition of corporate purpose is a disservice, 
not only to shareholders, but also to the corporation’s other constituents.  
Stakeholder theory, for critics, “directs corporate managers to serve ‘many 
masters’”94 and supports “special interest groups who wish to . . . enhance 
their influence over the allocation of corporate resources.”95  Rather, 
corporate success depends on clear goals for value—something critics 
argue is precluded by a stakeholder orientation.96 
 
A.  United States’ Shareholder Primacy 
 
Corporate governance in the United States consistently emphasizes the 
state’s limited role in regulating private property and private contracts.  
These “private” economic structures dominate U.S. corporate law and 
support a notion of shareholder primacy (in contrast to stakeholder 
governance) that fits into this regulatory regime.  The United States’ 
corporate governance strongly emphasizes the limited role government can 
and should play in regulating the “private” sector.  Descended from the 
British system of private property and liberty to contract,97 the United 
States’ legal framework allows private parties near complete dominion over 
their property.  The permissive regime governing property in the United 
States is supported by the paucity of restrictions in many areas, including 
zoning,98 eminent domain,99 and the land-marking of significant 
 
92 Id. at 8.  
93 Jensen, supra note 83, at 8–9.  But see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1 (“There is no 
longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-
term shareholder value.”). 
94 Jensen, supra note 83, at 9. 
95 Id. at 15 n.17. 
96 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 4–5 (“The collapse of the conglomerate movement in 
the 1970s and 1980s, however, largely destroyed the normative appeal of the managerialist model.  It is 
now the conventional wisdom that, when managers are given great discretion over corporate investment 
policies, they mostly end up serving themselves, however well-intentioned they may be.  While 
managerial firms may be in some ways more efficiently responsive to nonshareholder interests than are 
firms that are more dedicated to serving their shareholders, the price paid in inefficiency of operations 
and excessive investment in low-value projects is now considered too dear.”). 
97 NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER AND THE 
LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER (2003). 
98 See Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
99 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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buildings.100  The regulation of contract law follows an equally liberal 
model of limited state involvement, in which individuals are presumed to 
be rational actors empowered to enter into arms-length contracts.  The 
corporation’s interest, in U.S. corporate governance, is singular in focus 
and easy to identify: the shareholders.101  This overall framework grants 
extraordinary deference to the corporate entity, in sharp contrast to the 
corporatist tradition in Europe that accords the state a far greater role in 
managing the corporate sector both generally and with regard to specific 
corporations.102 
The United States’ corporate governance discourse has identified the 
shareholder/stakeholder primacy debate as central.  Shareholder primacy 
regards the corporation as a vehicle for maximizing the shareholders’ 
interests, primarily profits.  Boards, directors, and managers of corporations 
dictated by shareholder primacy focus on increasing investment returns for 
shareholders.103  Their bonuses often depend on this performance, and they 
structure mid- and lower-level workers’ goals around increasing returns for 
investors. 
 
1. The Predominance of Agency Theory 
 
Two iterations of early twentieth century corporate governance 
demonstrate the historic centrality of shareholder primacy.  First, Adolf 
Berle, the authority on modern corporate governance, played a large role in 
establishing the legitimacy of shareholder primacy.  His concern, at the end 
of the 1920s, was the increasingly centralized nature of corporate power, 
which he and his collaborator Gardiner Means projected would continue 
 
100 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
101 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 10 (“Of course, asserting the primacy of shareholder 
interests in corporate law does not imply that the interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go 
unprotected.  It merely indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests 
of nonshareholder constituencies—or at least all constituencies other than creditors—lie outside of 
corporate law.  For workers, this includes the law of labor contracting, pension law, health and safety 
law, and antidiscrimination law.  For consumers, it includes product safety regulation, warranty law, 
tort law governing product liability, antitrust law, and mandatory disclosure of product contents and 
characteristics.  For the public at large, it includes environmental law and the law of nuisance and mass 
torts.”).  One might even say that the business judgment rule’s deferential standard favors shareholder 
interests.  In the corporate governance context, the business judgment rule typifies the high level of 
deference courts extend to corporations and their boards in making determinations about the 
corporation’s behavior.  This standard requires board members to perform their duties in good faith, 
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances, and in a manner the director(s) reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.  See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  The presumption is that, “in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and 
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”  Id. 
102 For a discussion of corporatist policies in France, see Suk, supra note 53. 
103 Ayuso & Argandoña, supra note 86, at 9–10. 
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and transform the economy within decades.104  Berle and Means’s founding 
text, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, was based on the 
observation that the increasing liquidity of the U.S. financial markets had 
brought about a separation between capital ownership and management, 
concentrating excessive power in the hands of managers.105  This 
precipitated the reaction of re-balancing power in favor of shareholders and 
placing greater limits on managers to force them to prioritize the interests 
of the corporation over their own selfish interests.106  These premises are 
based on the economic model of agency theory, which was first developed 
by Michael Jensen and William Meckling,107 and led to the affirmation of 
the superior power of shareholders. 
As the Great Depression commenced, Berle worked with candidate 
and later President Franklin D. Roosevelt to enunciate a formulation of 
economic policy and corporate regulation that included shareholder 
primacy, enforced by the courts, as a key mechanism for remedying the 
excesses of the 1920s.  Through Berle’s articulation of shareholder 
primacy, a broad and diverse population of shareholders could control 
corporate managers, thereby mitigating the increasing concentration of 
economic power.108 
Second, the classic American case, Dodge v. Ford, which predated 
Berle’s work by a decade, raised this very question, although not in these 
exact terms.109  In that case, the Dodge brothers, owners of Dodge Motor 
 
104 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The 
Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010); see also William W. Bratton 
& Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern 
Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008). 
105 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. ed., 1968); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers 
are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).   
106 Antoine Rebérioux, Gouvernance d’entreprise et contrôle des dirigeants: 1932–2008, d’une 
crise à l’autre, in LES GOUVERNANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA CRISE: POUR UNE MEILLEURE 
PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 5–6 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2010).   
107 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
108 At the time, Means’s projections sent a clear message: something had to be done about corporate 
power, something more than Berle had thought previously.  Berle changed his views accordingly.  What 
he formerly saw as a governance problem to be treated contractually within the financial community 
now came to be seen as a case for judicial control in the name of the shareholder interest.  See sources 
cited supra note 105. 
109 Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  This case is widely recognized as an endorsement 
of shareholder primacy.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2003) (“Dodge’s theory of shareholder wealth 
maximization has been widely accepted by courts over an extended period of time.”); Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 739 (2005); Ian B. Lee, 
Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535–36 
(2006) (“Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. remains the high-water mark for shareholder primacy.”). 
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Company, then a competitor to Ford Motor Company, owned a ten percent 
stake in Ford.110  Ford’s profits were extraordinary after the development of 
the assembly line, and the vision of its president was similarly grandiose.  
Henry Ford declared, “My ambition . . . is to employ still more men; to 
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, 
to help them build up their lives and their homes.  To do this, we are 
putting the greatest share of our profits back into the business.”111  The 
Dodges sought to force Ford to issue a dividend to shareholders, an action 
Ford strongly resisted, claiming a cautious preference for maintaining 
substantial cash balances in case of emergency.112  Ford lost on the 
dividend issue, as the Dodge Court held that the corporation exists 
primarily for the shareholders’ benefit.113  Although the law has since 
shifted in favor of giving greater deference to management’s choices 
regarding the dispensation of profits, the principal of shareholder primacy 
remains a core value of corporate governance theory. 
 
2. The Paradox of Agency Theory 
 
In a literal sense, shareholder primacy is a misnomer: shareholders 
may be first in priority of duty owed, but they are last in right.  The 
shareholder’s legal right over the corporation is not that of an owner—
rather the shareholder “owns” a residual interest in the corporation’s 
profits.  This interest is last in right because all other creditors have the 
right to recover funds prior to the shareholder receiving any part of any 
profits.  Moreover, bondholders, and any other party with whom the 
corporation has contractual privity, step ahead of shareholders in claims 
against the corporation.  Since shareholders’ interests are residual, 
corporate governance norms place shareholders in the position of power 
both as the parties who elect the board of directors, and as the central 
beneficiaries of corporate success.  Even the most ardent advocate of 
shareholder primacy would never challenge the actual primacy of 
bondholders.114  Resistance to shareholder primacy, in addition to the 
 
110 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670–71.  
111 Id. at 671. 
112 Id. at 676–77. 
113 Id.  It is worth noting, however, that some object to this case’s celebrity.  See, e.g., Lynn A. 
Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008).  
114 Stout, supra note 81, at 1190 (“[W]e have made at least some intellectual progress over the 
intervening decades on the question of the proper role of the corporation.  In particular we have learned 
that some of the most frequently raised arguments for shareholder primacy are, not to put too fine a 
point on it, bad arguments.  By ‘bad’ arguments, I do not mean arguments that are somehow morally 
offensive or normatively unattractive.  Rather, I mean arguments that are, as a positive matter, 
inaccurate, incorrect, and unpersuasive to the careful and neutral observer.”).  It is worth noting that the 
growing importance of intangible assets is reshaping the basic conditions of corporate governance: “The 
aim is twofold: i) to explain logically why intangible assets modifies the allocation of residual claims, 
as company performance can substantially affect the wealth of other stakeholders ii) to determine which 
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increasingly growing support for CSR, created the space for stakeholder 
theory. 
In recent years, even during the current financial crisis, shareholder 
primacy has only gained traction.  One important provision in the Dodd-
Frank legislation authorizes shareholders to have nonbinding votes to 
approve executive pay.115  These “say on pay” rules do not significantly 
increase actual shareholder power, but they do convey that the 
empowerment of shareholders may serve as a brake on excessive corporate 
behavior.116 
In short, although stakeholder theory in the United States has become 
fairly elaborate, it remains a largely theoretical endeavor as shareholder 
theory continues to hold the preeminent place in practical corporate 
governance. 
 
B.  France’s Stakeholder Primacy 
 
The shareholder structure in many European Union states differs from 
that of the Unites States, even for large firms.  In Germany, France, and 
other European nations, ownership has historically been much more 
concentrated as banks, families, the state, and, most importantly, other non-
financial corporations comprise the majority of large shareholders.  These 
ownership patterns could lead to the assumption that the separation of 
ownership and control is prima facie irrelevant.  This assumption is not 
entirely true—the separation of ownership from control can occur through 
different means117—but many European countries progressively adopted a 
more stakeholder-oriented approach as skepticism about capitalism rose, 
 
constituencies should be considered as relevant stakeholders and contribute, to some extent, to the 
corporate governance.”  Arturo Capasso, Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Governance: The Role of 
Intangible Assets 2 (European Corp. Gov’t Inst., Working Paper, 2004) (“Company law says that 
shareholders own the assets and the free cash flows, but this only works on the basis of a primitive view 
of the nature of ownership and employment.  The crucial intangible assets could be, in many cases, out 
of the direct control of either shareholders or management.  They are, in fact, shared in common 
between the firm and some of its stakeholders, like employees, customers, suppliers.  In order to build 
and enhance its intangible endowment a firm has to establish and consolidate a trustworthy fiduciary 
relationship between the firm and these stakeholders.”). 
115 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
§ 951(a)(1) (2010). 
116 See Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119 (2010). 
117 A corporation with concentrated ownership can come within the managerial category due to the 
identity of its large shareholders, if the latter are not interested in controlling managers.  For instance, 
“cross-shareholding networks in Germany have this very effect since they are used as a shield against 
control oriented shareholders’ influence.” ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 (2009).  In France, where families are very present in large companies, 
the scale of operations often demands the delegation of control to a large managerial hierarchy.  
Moreover, concentrated ownership does not mean majority.  What was called the “noyaux durs” in the 
1980s in France meant that the new privatized corporation was still kept by a concentrated ownership, 
but was too small to have a majority for important decisions like takeovers or big strategic changes. 
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core governance shortcomings were revealed, and the concomitant need for 
reform in the EU became clear in the wake of hard financial times.118 
 
1.  Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance 
 
The preceding section reviewed corporate governance debates in 
terms of shareholder values.  Whereas economists once asserted, on the 
grounds that price reflects the scarcity of resources, that management 
should aim to maximize shareholders wealth,119 many Europeans, at least to 
a greater extent than their U.S. counterparts, believe that corporations 
should serve a larger social purpose and be “responsible,” that is, they 
should reach out to other stakeholders and not only to shareholders.120  This 
perspective draws on fundamental beliefs about the role of the state and the 
private sector, which differ between the United States and the European 
Union.  Corporate decisions have a significant effect on various groups, 
such as employees, communities, and creditors.  Thus proponents of 
stakeholder governance contend that the effect of these decisions should 
compel corporations to recognize ethical considerations and duties toward 
these groups. 
Two issues should be mentioned before discussing the implementation 
of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance.  First, there is the paradox 
that U.S. economists have elaborated stakeholder theory more than in 
Europe,121 even though European corporations pay far more attention to 
 
118 The European Commission adopted a proposal on April 16, 2013 for a directive enhancing the 
transparency of certain large companies on social and environmental matters.  This Directive amends 
the Accounting Directives (Fourth and Seventh Accounting Directives on Annual and Consolidated 
Accounts, 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, respectively).  The objective is to increase EU companies’ 
transparency and performance on environmental and social matters, and, therefore, to contribute 
effectively to long-term economic growth and employment.  Companies concerned will need to disclose 
information on policies, risks and results as regards environmental matters, social and employee-related 
aspects, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and diversity on the boards of 
directors.  On February 6, 2013, the European Parliament adopted two resolutions acknowledging the 
importance of company transparency in these fields.  See Comm. on Legal Affairs, Eur. Parl., Report on 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent and Responsible Business Behavior and 
Sustainable Growth, A7-0017/2013 (Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0017+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; Comm. on 
Employment and Social Affairs, Eur. Parl., Report on Corporate Social Responsibility: Promoting 
Society’s Interests and a Route to Sustainable and Inclusive Recovery, A7-0023/2013 (Feb. 6, 2013), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0023 
&language=EN. 
119 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 14–73 (2006). 
120 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 4 (“Recent academic literature has focused on the 
“stakeholder” model of the corporation as the principal alternative to the shareholder-oriented model.  
The stakeholder model, however, is essentially just a combination of elements found in the older 
manager-oriented and labor-oriented models.”). 
121 Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder 
Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 641, 676–718 (2011) (discussing the historical 
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stakeholders in their governance and their practices.122  Second, we must 
clarify to what the concept exactly refers.  Stakeholder-oriented corporate 
governance can have two different meanings.123  On the one hand, the 
stakeholder concept may refer to a “broad mission of the management.”124  
According to this view, management should aim at maximizing surplus 
from the sum of the various stakeholders.  On the other hand, the 
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance may refer to the sharing of 
control by stakeholders,125 such as codetermination in Germany.  
Presumably, the two notions are related.126  For instance, it would be hard 
for a manager to sacrifice profit to benefit a stakeholder not directly 
associated with the company or its management.  Further, by including 
stakeholders that are in control of the company, it can be presumed that 
they will consider the stakeholders in management’s mission. 
This synthesized definition has a two-fold impact on the 
implementation of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance.  First, it 
gives priority to long-term strategy.  According to the “broad mission of the 
management” concept, managers have to pay attention not only to 
shareholders’ interest, but also to the interests of employees, creditors, and 
the public.  These new managerial missions naturally imply that the 
corporation’s existence is presumed to be robust and profitable into the 
future.  The managerial vision thus becomes more long-term focused rather 
than short-term.127 
 
debates on stakeholder theory in Germany and France). 
122 At the time Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means started elaborating the foundations of what became 
the economic model of agency theory, a debate took place between Berle and E. Merrick Dodd over 
how to tackle the issue of separation between property and control.  Dodd followed a novel pluralist approach 
as he sought to expand the theory of “corporate realism” to include corporate social responsibility.  He 
accepted that the corporation is a real entity, distinct from its shareholders, but similar to any other real person, 
that entity has a social role and should be subjected to the principles of citizenship.  Thus, in the case of 
corporate citizens, purely economic self-interest (i.e., profit maximization), may be subjected to other social 
objectives.  The adoption of a realist stance is crucial for the plausibility of this assertion.  Thus, when Dodd 
detached the corporate interest from shareholder interests, CSR could be inserted.  Having dealt with the 
definition problem of the corporate interests in this manner, Dodd was able to engage upon the accountability 
issue.  In a realistic view, since managers had to discharge their duties in accordance with the SR entity that is 
distinct from its shareholders, they should also be expected to have “a sense of responsibility toward 
employees, consumers, and the general public.”  See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties 
of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935).  In other words, Dodd’s answer to the 
debate’s question was that managers are trustees for the corporation as SR person rather than for the 
shareholders as Berle believed.  




127 This priority strengthens the firm establishment of stable shareholding in the capital of large 
companies, a little like the “hard cores” of the 1980s.  For a redefinition of this notion, see Yann Paclot, Le 
gouvernement d’entreprise, pour quoi faire? Quelques reflexions en relisant le code de gouvernement 
d’entreprise des societies cotées, in LES GOUVERNANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA CRISE: POUR UNE 
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Second, this synthesized definition compels one to re-examine the 
notion of the “corporation’s interest.”  The argument can be challenged to 
the extent that the notions of “profit” and “value” are distinguishable.  
Corporate governance recommendations today, at least in European 
countries, seek to provide economic operators with the means to create 
value.128  This is nothing new, given that it was already the underlying idea 
of agency theory.  The analysis differs today in that it reverts to a more 
respectful notion of the corporation, regarded as a legal person, 
independent of its associates, who are not the “owners” of the corporation 
itself.  Corporations indeed appear to have a broader objective than merely 
creating shareholder value, which results in distinguishing between the 
corporation’s interest and the common interest of the shareholders.129  
“Creating value” would thus suppose that the corporation itself grows more 
valuable, and not solely that its shareholders grow richer.130 
 This notion naturally implies that the corporation is durable, 
profitable, and even prosperous.  In this respect, the corporation’s interest 
does not begin and end with the shareholders’ interest, but implies taking 
into account all the interests that companies must guarantee.  Recognition 
of a corporation’s broader interest and the aims of governance as they have 
just been set out, tally perfectly: corporate bodies must fulfill their mission 
to protect the corporation’s interest.  In other words, they must create value 
for the benefit of all the stakeholders.  The resurgence of the corporation’s 
 
MEILLEURE PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 279 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2010).  Several studies prove that 
companies with a core body of shareholders perform better and that increasing shareholder power 
during hostile takeover bids is appropriate.  New activism is emerging, in favour of legal tools, which 
enable both shareholders and managers to adopt long-term strategies.  This is seen in France by marked 
opposition to returning to the principle of proportional votes, and in the double voting right granted to 
white squares by Code de commerce Article L225-43.  This concern is also shared by ethical 
investment funds in which good governance practices, such as sustainable development and ethical 
commitments, are key factors of assessment by market players.  It is interesting to note that the crisis 
does not appear to have weakened the trend in favour of socially responsible investing.  Catherine 
Malecki, l’Investissement socialement responsable: quelques remarques sur une valeur montante de la 
gouvernance d’entreprise, in LES GOUVERNANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA CRISE: POUR UNE 
MEILLEURE PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 263 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2010).  With 37% growth in a time of 
crisis, CSR confirms its status as a “safe investment” and provides the advantage, today, of insisting 
upon the “green economy.”  See generally MANUEL FLAM, L’ÉCONOMIE VERTE (2010). 
128 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
129 TIROLE, supra note 119, at 56–62; PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, L’ENTREPRISE DANS LA 
DÉMOCRATIE: UNE THÉORIE POLITIQUE DU GOUVERNEMENT DES ENTREPRISES (De Boeck ed., 2009). 
130 It is interesting to note than even U.K. legislation seems to have shifted toward a more 
stakeholder-oriented concept.  The enactment of Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 in the U.K. 
has codified the duty to act in the interest of the company.  Now, the director of a U.K. company must 
act in a way they consider, in good faith, to be most likely to promote the success of the company “for 
the benefit of its members as a whole and in doing so must have regard to the interests of employees, 
the environment, the local community, suppliers and customers.”  Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 
(U.K.).  
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interest,131 of which corporate officers are the guardians, is central to new 
theories seeking to distinguish the company’s interests from the ones who 
own parts of its capital.  In light of this notion, the role of executives can be 
redefined, and corporation management can be integrated into a company’s 
long-term scheme.132 
One core objection to stakeholder governance is that it may weaken 
the governance structure overall.  One issue with the sharing of control 
between investors and natural stakeholders is that it focuses less on income 
generation than would be the case with exclusive investor control.133  But 
two arguments can be made to address that objection.  First, when priority 
is given to a long-term strategy, it strengthens the establishment of stable 
shareholding in the capital of large companies.  Historically, France 
experimented with this in the 1980s, with the so-called “hard core.”134  
Today, the concern is also shared by ethical investment funds in which 
good governance practices, such as sustainable development and ethical 
commitments, are key factors of assessment by market players.135 
Even though it is by no means synonymous with a stakeholder 
approach, CSR has become a relevant financing tool for listed corporations.  
To date, it has survived despite the financial crisis.136  Since 2012, the 
European Commission defines corporate social responsibility as “the 
responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society.”137  To fully meet 
their social responsibility, enterprises “should have in place a process to 
integrate social, environmental, ethical human rights and consumer concerns 
into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with 
their stakeholders.”138  CSR allows collective or individual investment 
based on social, ethical, environmental, or corporate governance criteria.  
Even though its variety may be a source of complexity, it nonetheless 
 
131 For a redefinition of this notion, see Paclot, supra note 127, at 279. 
132 See François Guy Trébulle, Stakeholder Theory et Droit des Sociétés, 12 BULL. JOLY SOCIÉTÉS 
1337 (2006); François Guy Trébulle, Stakeholder theory et droit des sociétés, 1 BULL. JOLY SOCIÉTÉS 7 
(2007); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—
and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011; Michael. E. Porter 
& Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate 
Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78–92; Geoffrey Heal et al., Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Doing Well by Doing Good? (Wharton Sch. Working Paper, Sept. 2005); P. Escande, 
RSE: Michael Porter plaide pour la shared value, LES ECHOS (Mar. 14, 2011).   
133 TIROLE, supra note 119, at 59–60. 
134 Again, what was called the “noyaux durs” in the 1980’s in France, or hard core, meant that the 
new privatized corporation was still kept by a concentrated ownership, but it was too small to have a 
majority on important decisions like takeovers or big strategic changes. 
135 It is interesting to note that the crisis does not appear to have weakened the trend in favour of 
socially responsible investing.  See Malecki, supra note 127. 
136 With 37% growth in a time of crisis, CSR confirms its status as a safe investment and provides 
the advantage, today, of insisting upon the green economy.  See generally FLAM, supra note 127. 
137 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/ 
sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
138 Id. 
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offers an important new way of investing.  Despite its differences from 
stakeholder-focused governance, the relevant feature of CSR is that, unlike 
most common funds, it considers long-term profitability more important 
that short-term profitability.  CSR can involve socially responsible funds—
or so-called sustainable development funds—that focus on the adherence of 
companies to sustainable development criteria (Scandinavian countries and 
Germany are developing more of the “green funds” technique) or exclusion 
funds (more faithful to the initial concept born in the United States with the 
Quaker movement, which prohibited its members from investing in 
companies operating in the weapons, tobacco, or even alcohol industries).  
Thus, these funds are open to long-term institutional investors who are 
aware that, far from being a “marketing” concern, these funds make it 
possible to consider, within long-term strategies, questions relative to 
climate change, threats to fundamental human rights, and matters 
surrounding corporate governance.  Therefore, CSR is at the heart of 
stakeholder-oriented governance and expands stakeholder values into labor 
and environmental laws. 
Managerial accountability constitutes another issue for stakeholder-
oriented corporate governance.  Unlike an executive with a well-defined 
mission to maximize shareholder value—viewed as an objective task—the 
socially-oriented manager faces a wide range of missions, most of which 
are, by nature, not entirely measurable.139  Concretely, it may be that the 
management’s invocation of multiple and hard-to-measure missions would 
serve as an excuse for “self-serving behavior,” making managers less 
accountable.140  This argument suggests that the competency criterion 
should be restored.141 
The corporate governance debates reviewed in this Article show a 
radical theoretical dichotomy between the U.S. approach of corporate 
governance and the European one.  The next part will show that these 
variations are deeply rooted in a cultural context.142 
 
139 TIROLE, supra note 119, at 60. 
140 Id. 
141 One criticism of stakeholder-orientated governance is that it leaves the corporation with “two 
masters”—stakeholders and shareholders—with the concomitant cost.  Increased capital costs attend to 
the stakeholder-oriented firms in the United States. 
142 So far, demonstrations of this new conception of governance have been limited to giving rules of 
law a remedial role, correcting certain cognitive mistakes made by executives.  This stage would now 
appear to be behind us, given the European Community’s establishment in 2008 of a much more 
promising rule, that of compliance, or, to refer to its true English origin, “comply or explain.”  
Introduced on July 3, 2008 transposing a provision of EC Directive 2006/46, this rule stipulates that 
“when it voluntarily refers to a corporate governance code,” a listed corporation must specify in the 
report enclosed with the management report “the provisions it has set aside and why,” or, if it “does not 
refer to such a code,” it must state, in the same report “the rules applied in addition to legal 
requirements and the reasons why it decided not to apply any provision of the code.”  Council Directive 
2006/46, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1 (EC); Véronique Magnier, La règle de conformité ou l’illustration d’une 
acculturation méthodologique complexe, in LES GOUVERNANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA 
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2.  French Corporatism and the Role of Stakeholders 
 
The U.S. system of corporate governance is characterized by the 
largest businesses listed on securities markets with a very large 
shareholding base.143  This base interacts with management at an arm’s 
length basis.  Thus, the state’s role in regulating private property and 
private contracts is limited.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, European 
countries’ systems are traditionally characterized by the relative 
unimportance of the securities market as a source of finance.144  According 
to this tradition, the principal sources of finance in a country such as France 
are banks, families, non-financial corporations, and the government.145  
Shareholdings tend to be more concentrated, and shareholders, organized 
labor, government, and creditors are more actively involved in the control 
of companies.  Financing now may be largely globalized as investors fund 
corporations without much regard to their domicile, a factor that may 
diminish the “Frenchness” of French corporations.  Even so, the continued 
presence of the French state as a large shareholder in key industries gives it 
extensive influence, both formal and informal, over economic activity 
within France. 
Until the nineteenth century, full incorporation could not take place 
unless a special charter was granted by statute or decree.146  The state was 
heavily involved in the incorporation process.  That is, for groups of 
individuals to become legal persons, or corporations, a license from the state 
was necessary.  The 1866 law on incorporation, however, allowed a group of 
individuals to become a corporation, without any concession from the state; 
only registration was necessary.147  Still, many sectors of the economy 
remained under the control of the state, which owned the capital of a great 
number of companies.  Strategic sectors like defense, of course, were state 
owned.148  Additionally, railways, transportation, and electricity were the full 
 
CRISE: POUR UNE MEILLEURE PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 250 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2010).  Compliance, 
or rather non-compliance, is an opportunity for companies; it brings flexibility and is a real tool for 
preventing cognitive errors in that, without imposing anything, the law suggests and models.  On these 
changes to the rules of law in general, see CATHERINE THIBIERGE, LA FORCE NORMATIVE, NAISSANCE 
D’UN CONCEPT (2010).  It provides an “architecture of choices,” which executives can simply use as a 
basis for decision-making, but it still needs to be aided by a culture of motivation. See generally Cass R. 
Sustein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 
(2008). 
143 See generally MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME (Seuil ed., 1991). 
144 DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 117.  
145 See generally GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129. 
146 MICHEL GERMAIN & VÉRONIQUE MAGNIER, TRAITÉ DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES: TOMES 2, LES 
SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES (20th ed. 2011). 
147 GEORGES RIPERT, ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DU CAPITALISME MODERNE (1951).  
148 See generally GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129. 
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property of the state and submitted to specific public regulation.149 
The institutional arrangements coming out of the Bretton Woods 
Agreements in 1944 emerged from post-war devastation and aimed to 
create a stable macroeconomic environment that would ensure continuous 
investment and growth.150  Within that international framework, national 
governments were able to implement expansionary policies, which ensured 
that effective demand was sufficient to absorb increasing industrial 
output.151  As part of this process of reconstruction, this post-war period 
was characterized in France as a movement toward “nationalization.”152  
Nationalization entails the transfer of property from the private sector to the 
state.  The state then recapitalizes many large companies with public 
money.  This movement started no later than December 1944 with the 
nationalization of Renault, and then, in December 1945, with banks such as 
Crédit Lyonnais, le Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris, la Banque 
Nationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie, and la Société Générale.153  It 
ended in 1948 with coal, gas and electricity, insurance companies, and 
transportation.154  In October 1946, the preamble of the newly drafted 
Constitution stressed the importance of this political decision to recapitalize 
a major part of the private economy with public funds.155 
Although privatization developed for decades, this progression shifted 
when President Mitterrand undertook a wave of nationalizations in the 
eighties.  Seven big industrial companies (such as Thomson, Rhône-
Poulenc and Saint-Gobain) and almost thirty banks became held by the 
state.  France belongs to the so-called “insider” systems, where shareholdings 
tend to be more concentrated, and government and (public) creditors are 
more actively involved in the control of the corporations.156  French 
corporatism reflects the role of the state in the private sector and a 
commensurate acquiescence to public goals within the private sector.  
These public goals necessarily implicate issues and participation supported 
by stakeholders.  As a result, the French corporate governance system in 
the private sector is stakeholder oriented and forms part of a tightly woven 








154 GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129 
155 1946 CONST. pmbl., art. 9 (Fr.) (“Tout bien, toute entreprise, dont l’exploitation a ou acquiert les 
caractères d’un service public national ou d’un monopole de fait, doit devenir la propriété de la 
collectivité.”).  
156 DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 117, at chs. 2, 5. 
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IV.  CURRENCY OF STAKEHOLDER PRACTICE 
 
The theoretical debate surrounding corporate governance already 
appears in legal jurisdictions at the national, European, and international 
levels, and its controversy continues to increase. 
 
A.  The EU and Growing International Interest in Stakeholder-
Oriented Corporate Governance 
 
Currently, several factors, both economic and more general, have 
prompted the European Commission to question the state of corporate 
governance on both a micro- and macro-economic level in order to restore 
confidence in the single market for shareholders and for all other 
stakeholders in society.157  The global financial crisis exposed the limits of 
the present system of governance of financial institutions.  The volatility of 
the global marketplace struck every developed economy, in nearly all 
sectors.  Without bringing the fundamentals of the governance of private 
law companies into question in this post-crisis period, policymakers should 
concern themselves with the development of corporate governance, which, 
by nature, is not static. 
Different shareholding structures of companies result in differing 
governance and performance.158  For example, in France, one-third of 
businesses listed on a regulated market use dispersed shareholding whereas 
two-thirds of businesses use a dominant family shareholding.159  Therefore, 
of particular concern are those in the first third, as family businesses are 
traditionally better managed and perform better.160  We must bear in mind 
that important points of departure exist between the U.S. and European 
financial systems.  One interesting difference relates to the size of the stock 
market.  Anglo-Saxon countries have well-developed stock markets, 
whereas in Europe, stock markets are smaller.  Further, in France and 
Germany, many relatively large firms choose to remain private.161  There 
are also wide variations in the concentration of shares across countries.  
Family-owned firms play a major role.162  Firms with one controlling 
owner are not rare and, frequently, family-controlled firms have top 
managers from the controlling family.  In contrast, ownership concentration 
is much smaller in Anglo-Saxon countries and ownership is largely 
dispersed in the United States.  A last point of departure between the two 
 
157 See generally EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 608) (2011). 
158 See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. 
FIN. 737 (1995). 
159 GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129. 
160 David Sraer & David Thesmar, Performance and Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence from the 
French Stock Market, 4 J.  EUR. ECON. ASS’N 709 (2007).   
161 TIROLE, supra note 119. 
162 GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129. 
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systems is the degree of stability of stockholdings.  Institutional investors 
dominate liquidity trading in the United States.  They reshuffle their 
portfolios frequently.  German investors have traditionally been long-term 
investors.  The turnover rate is thus an important difference between the 
United States and Europe, and these differences have a significant impact 
on corporation practices.  Therefore, the solutions imposed on U.S. 
companies do not necessarily apply to European companies, whose 
shareholders are more concentrated.163 
According to several recent European studies, including one on the 
European Corporate Governance Framework, the aim of corporate 
governance should be to create value for shareholders and stakeholders.164  
Indeed, OECD norms reflect this perspective.  The OECD effectively 
defines corporate governance as “the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled” and as “a set of relationships between a 
corporation’s management, its board, its shareholders, and its other 
stakeholders.”165 
Another important European shift in this direction, with the ultimate 
aim being the prosperity and long-term future of the company, is the 
emergence of sustainable development in its most recent forms.  Originally, 
CSR166 was a matter of self-regulation.  Its aim was to correct “the natural 
 
163 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 158, at 737–83.   
164 See FLAM, supra note 127. PIERRE-YVES Gomez, Propos conclusifs, in LES GOUVERNANCES 
DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA CRISE: POUR UNE MEILLEURE PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 290 
(L.G.D.J. ed., 2010). 
165 OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE 11 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf. 
166 By tradition, the leading CSR market on its own represents 65% of CSR funds, though it also 
exists in Canada, South Africa, Asia, Morocco, and naturally, in the Scandinavian countries. In France, 
the Novethic indicator is indicative of the constant growth of CSR, while the leader in the French market is 
Dexia AM.  Insurance companies, pension funds, and collective investment undertakings are increasingly 
sensitive to CSR.  Companies in the chemical and petroleum sectors, clearly the most concerned by CSR, and 
even more so banking establishments that are in charge of accompanying industrial investments, pay very 
particular attention to CSR.  Since 2005, the CERES annual reports have clearly indicated an change of 
attitude in the banking sector, which is including environmental data as part of risk management.  CSR is at the 
heart of the stakeholder approach, through the values that it spreads into labor and environmental laws, and 
France, which has been concerned with corporate governance issues since the beginning of 2000s, has recently 
been sensitive to this trend.  Hence, the burden of social and environmental duties weighing on listed 
corporations has been strengthened by the passage of the Grenelle II Act.  Since 2001, French law required 
listed companies to report in their annual report on “how the corporation is taking into account the social and 
environmental consequences of its activities.”  Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national 
pour l’environnement [Law 2010-788 of July 12, 2010 on the National Commitment for the Environment], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 13, 2010, p. 
12905.  The implementing decree of the 2001 law (February 20, 2002) drew up a list of social and 
environmental information that the corporation was required to provide, ranging from the consumption of 
water resources, raw materials and energy, greenhouse gas emissions, and equality of opportunity between 
men and women to the inclusion of the disabled.  The weakness of the CSR is that it is based on voluntary 
commitments, and the 2001 law provided for no specific sanction in the event that the information obligation 
is not respected.  Still, the Grenelle II Act, passed in July 2010, in addition to extending the scope of this 
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effects of markets, in response to the expectations of other than economic 
actors in contemporary societies.”167  Therefore, it was defined by the 
European Commission as “a concept whereby companies integrate social 
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”168  Despite CSR’s 
voluntary origins, the European Commission recently turned its attention to 
redefining it.  A recent, non-binding communication states that CSR may 
turn out to merely be “the responsibility of enterprises for their impact on 
society.”169  Nor is this change in emphasis an isolated occurrence.  
International Standard ISO 26000170 actually goes further, requiring 
companies to adopt “transparent and ethical behaviour that contributes to 
sustainable development.”171 Thus, CSR is moving away from a voluntary 
basis to a required method of conducting corporate governance. 
In limited companies, the guarantors of the corporation’s interest are 
the board of directors and the supervisory board, not shareholders.  The 
latter may, legitimately, vote in favor of their own self-serving interests—
for example, by fixing a high rate of dividends, despite the fact that such a 
rate would impede the development of the business.  The role of the board 
of directors and the supervisory board to protect the corporations’ interest 
is thus vital to good corporate governance.  Moreover, the reflections of the 
1992 Cadbury Report, the precursor to all other European corporate 
governance codes, and the first governance committees presided over by 
Marc Viénot in France, were dedicated to the effective functioning of the 
board of directors. 
The emergence of a broadly defined corporate interest, as stakeholder 
theory understands it, now reinforces the custom of stable shareholdings in 
the capital of large companies and encourages directors to adopt a more 
long-term strategy. 
 
information to almost all companies, makes the obligation of information enforceable. 
167 Michel Doucin, Dimension internationale de la responsabilité sociale et environnementale, in 
DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET ENTREPRISE 15–22 (Véronique Magnier & Laurent Fonbaustier eds., 
2013). 
168 Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, at 6, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=5511. 
169 EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 681) 2 (2011). 
170 ISO 26000 provides guidance on social responsibility (SR).  Eighty countries and thirty-nine 
organizations with liaison status are participating in the SR working group under the joint leadership of ISO 
members from Brazil (ABNT) and Sweden (SIS).  The main stakeholder groups are represented: industry, 
government, labor, consumers, nongovernmental organizations, service, support, research, and others, as well 
as a geographical and gender-based balance of participants.  ISO 26000 Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
171 ISO 26000 defines CSR as “the responsibility of an organisation for the impact of its decisions 
and activities on society and the environment, through transparent and ethical behaviour that contributes 
to sustainable development.”  Id.  
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B.  Structural Differentials 
 
The board of directors plays a central role in corporate governance, 
and one crucial characteristic to consider is whether that board has one or 
two tiers.  Typically, Germany employs a traditional two-tier model that is 
known in Europe as the “Rhine model.”172  Recently, there were significant 
legal changes to board structures in Europe.  This subpart explores the core 
elements of French and German boards that distinguish them from U.S. 
boards, and articulates the structural basis for stakeholderism in European 
board governance. 
 
1.  One and Two-Tiered Boards: Contrasting French and German 
Governance 
 
In Germany, as in other European countries—including the 
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, and Portugal—a two-tier board with 
separated management and supervisory boards is required.173  Two-tier 
boards have existed since 1619 in the Netherlands.174  Legal regimes 
separate management from control.  Mandatory incompatibility rules 
support this separation, which stipulates that members of the supervisory 
board are forbidden from being directors, and vice-versa.  In practice, 
though, the supervisory board has rarely limited itself to mere control and 
instead has taken on an advisory function.  As Klaus Hopt explains: 
 
[T]he division between the tasks of the management board and 
the supervisory board varies according to business sector, size of 
the corporation, tradition and, in particular, the presence of 
strong leaders on the board or the other.  Sometimes the 
chairman of the management board, alone or together with the 
chairman of the supervisory board, selects the members of the 
supervisory board without much ado, though formally they must 
be elected by shareholders.  Sometimes the chairman of the 
supervisory board is the leading figure on whose benevolence the 
chairman of the management board depends, and who picks the 




172 See generally ALBERT, supra note 143. 
173 Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: the State of the Art and International 
Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2011). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 21. 
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In a single-tier system, which is commonplace in the United States, 
shareholders elect board members to one board, which oversees the entire 
corporation.  For U.S. firms, the two-tier system can appear to be quite 
sophisticated and complicated, in part because the supervisory role may 
implicate distinct duties in different firms.  In a two-tier board structure, 
there is an executive board and a supervisory board.  In Germany, the latter 
is composed entirely of nonexecutive board members, half of whom are 
labor representatives.  In Germany, the main reason for the strict 
maintenance of the two-tier board is the politically cemented policy of 
labor codetermination, which is hardly tolerable for shareholders in a one-
tier system. 
In 1966, France introduced the possibility of choosing a two-tier 
model, but many corporations still retain the traditional one-tier system.  
The study of numerous French and European companies reveals that a high 
majority of boards of directors in France (eighty percent of companies in 
the CAC 40) in comparison to supervisory boards.176  In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, many corporations that had initially chosen a two-tier 
system shifted to a one-tier model for economic and flexibility reasons.177 
French law defines how the board is designated.  In a one-tier system, 
shareholders select members of the board.  In practice, however, members 
of the board are first identified and chosen by the president director 
general, with the help of the nomination committee.  The Corporations Act 
contains very few provisions regarding the composition of the board, with 
the exception of provisions relating to the minimum (3) and maximum (18) 
size, the duration of office, and the gender quota.  Staggered boards and 
cumulative voting are not permitted, nor is mandatory minority shareholder 
representation.  Indeed, in France, few prescriptions for the board structure 
exist, rendering the codetermination requirement a distinct feature of 
German board governance. 
Since 2001, the chairman of the board of directors does not assume, in 
principle, the general direction of the corporation.  This role has devolved 
to the chief executive officer, who is fully autonomous within the 
corporation and not subordinate to the chairperson.  It should be noted, 
however, that the chairman may also—but is not obliged to—exercise the 
functions of chief executive officer.178  Studies show that the separation of 
powers between the chairman and chief executive officer in single-tier 
companies is in rapid decline.  In fact, the proportion of directing chairpersons 
 
176 Alain Pietrancosta, Paul-Henri Dubois & Romain Garçon, Corporate Boards in France, in 
CORPORATE BOARDS IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE 175, 185 (2014). 
177 Christophe Perchet, Pertinence et pérennité de la SA avec conseil d’administration, 4 BULLETIN 
JOLY SOCIÉTÉS 440, § 86 (2009) (explaining this preference with reference to the numerous 
disadvantages associated with the dualist model—most importantly the unsatisfactory distribution of 
powers and responsibilities between the directors and the supervisory board—and the multiple 
advantages of the monist model). 
178 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 225-51-1, para. 1 (Fr.). 
R&M_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:36 PM 
 Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of Corporate Governance 
 34:249 (2014)  
 
287 
increased in 2011, reaching fifty-five percent of companies on the index.179 
The board of directors is responsible for deciding whether the 
functions of the chief executive officer are to be exercised by the chairman 
of the board or by another individual.180  The articles of incorporation must 
define the conditions under which the board of directors decides this 
matter.  Thus, a particular majority of the board may be required for 
approval, or it may be necessary to adhere to a specific time period (for 
example, the end of the current mandate) before passing from one method 
to another.  Shareholders may be informed of the decision of the board of 
directors, either at any time of year upon request—this right forms part of 
the shareholders’ permanent communication right181—or annually at the 
general meeting.  According to the AFEP-MEDEF Corporate Governance 
Code, “[i]t is essential for the shareholders and third parties to be fully 
informed of the choice made.”182  Listed companies that have chosen to 
refer to this code must account for their choice through compliance with 
the “comply or explain” rule.183 
Practitioners are conscious of the risk to the reputation of big French 
companies posed by investing an excess of power in an individual rather 
than an office.  As the Vivendi and Société Générale cases have shown, the 
fall of a very charismatic chief executive officer damages the corporation’s 
image.184  Consequently, a new figure has gradually emerged in businesses 
with boards of directors in which the functions of the chairperson of the 
board and chief executive officer are still united: the lead director 
(administrateur référent).  The characteristics, duties, and prerogatives of 
this director are defined for the most part in the internal regulations of the 
board of directors.  Primarily, the aim is to guarantee the prerogatives of 
the board of directors and respect good governance practices in the context 
of a directorship exercised by a Chairman-CEO.185  The AMF, which 
encourages this practice in hopes of preventing conflicts of interest 
associated with holding the dual functions of CEO and chairman,186 
 
179 See ERNST & YOUNG, PANORAMA DES PRATIQUES DE GOUVERNANCE DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES 
FRANÇAISES (2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Etude_Gouvernance_ 
2012/$FILE/Etude_Gouvernance_2012.pdf. 
180 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 225-51-1, para. 2 (Fr.).   
181 FRANCIS LEFEBVRE, MÉMENTO PRATIQUE: SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES (2011).   
182 ASS’N FRANÇAISE DE ENTREPRISES PRIVÉES & MOUVEMENT DES ENTREPRISES DE FRANCE 
[AFEP-MEDEF], CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE OF LISTED CORPORATIONS 4 (2013), available at 
http://total.com/en/AFEP-MEDEF-code. 
183 Under French law, internal regulations are not required by law, but almost all listed companies 
have them. 
184 See, e.g., Florence Renard-Gourdon, Le sept vies de Jean-Marie Messier, LESECHOS.FR (Jan. 21, 
2011), http://www.lesechos.fr/entreprises-secteurs/tech-medias/dossier/300390167/300390167-les-sept-
vies-de-jean-marie-messier-99922.php. 
185 It is worth noting that the United States has seen a significant push by shareholders and proxy 
advisors to split the Chair from the CEO position. 
186 AUTORITÉ DES MARCHÉS FIANCIERS, RAPPORT 2010 DE L’AMF SUR LE GOUVERNEMENT 
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recommends that companies which have put a lead director in place 
precisely define his role and duties along with the means and prerogatives 
he possesses.  The AMF envisages that the functions of this individual will 
be further refined during the evaluation of the board of directors or in the 
report of the chairman on the governance of the corporation. 
Moreover, independent directors, as distinguished from non-executive 
directors and outside directors, are considered an important aspect of 
corporate governance in France.  Although French law does not require the 
independence of directors, the AFEP-MEDEF states that, for listed 
companies without a controlling shareholder, half of the directors must be 
independent, and in other companies, at least a third.187  Independent 
directors should account for two-thirds of the audit committee, and on other 
committees, half of the members should be independent.188  This role for 
independent directors reflects a European trend in corporate governance 
that focuses on board composition.  The actual criteria for independence, 
however, remain unclear—specifically who should determine the 
independence of a non-executive director.  There has been no consensus on 
this issue in France or in Europe.189 
 
2.  Representation of Labor on Boards 
 
In many European countries, there is mandatory codetermination, but 
in such cases, labor usually represents one-third of board membership.190  
For example, Germany traditionally has the most stringent rule regarding 
codetermination.191  That occurred as a result of Germany’s need to 
stabilize its economy after WWII, and, therefore, relies on the “social 
peace” theory that appeals to dialogue and negotiations between managers 
and workers.  Consequently, Germany mandates shareholder and labor 
membership parity on the supervisory board.  This mandated parity exists 
in conjunction with a mandatory large size (more than twenty), and a two-
tier structure.  Commenting on this structure, Hansmann and Kraakman 
note that “[t]oday, even inside Germany, few commentators argue for 
codetermination as a general model for corporate law in other jurisdictions.  
Rather, codetermination now tends to be defended in Germany as, at most, 
a workable adaptation to local interests and circumstances or, even more 
modestly, as an experiment of questionable value that would now be 
 
D’ENTREPRISE ET LA RÉMUNÉRATION DES DIRIGEANTS [AMF REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS] (July 12, 2010).  
187 See CODE DE GOUVERNEMENT D’ENTREPRISE DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES [CORPORATE GOVERNMENT 
CODE], art. 9 (2013) (Fr.). 
188 Id. 
189 Hopt, supra note 173, at 2720. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
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politically difficult to undo.”192  Regardless of whether labor codetermination 
continues as a result of tradition or an ongoing belief in its contributions, it 
does accord this centrally important stakeholder some shared role in 
governance. 
France, conversely, is more circumspect about labor participation on 
the board of directors.  France has recently and cautiously followed the 
trend toward codetermination by giving labor, under certain circumstances, 
up to two seats on the board of a listed corporation, whether it is a one- or a 
two-tier system.  Since 2002, this is a voluntary option, provided that 
employees own more than three percent of the capital.  This choice is 
determined by shareholders who vote on whether to give these two seats to 
labor representatives.  In practice, “shareholders are not fond of labor 
codetermination, because it diminishes the power of their own candidates 
and seriously weaken[s] their role in the decision-making of the board.”193  
It should be noted that, in France, worker representatives also dislike this 
codetermination approach, evidenced by their reticence to have their anti-
capitalist perspective co-opted into the corporate structure.194  Under this 
approach, labor law is considered much more protective of workers than 
corporate law. 
Accordingly, apart from the right to be represented on the board, labor 
rights in France are protected by other mechanisms.  For example, the 
European Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 provides for 
information rights of labor representatives of the two corporations involved 
in a bid as soon as it has been made public.195  The offer document must 
contain information relevant to the bidder’s intention with regard to the 
future business of the target corporation and the likely repercussions for 
employment.  Later, there must also be information for, and consultation 
with, the representative’s employees.  More generally, although traditionally 
protective of employees’ rights, French labor law is becoming more 
protective thanks to the EU directives.196 
 
 
192 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
193 Id. at 53. 
194 Unions in the U.K. were skeptical for the same reasons during the 1970s when codetermination 
was considered.  See generally ALAN BULLOCK & BARRON BULLOCK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
INQUIRY INTO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1977). 
195 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12. 
196 See, e.g., Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2002 Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees in the European 
Community, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29; Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the 
Establishment of a European Works Council or a Procedure in Community-scale Undertakings and 
Community-scale Groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Employees, 
1994 O.J. (L 254) 64. 
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C.  Possible Effect of FCBQ on Stakeholders 
 
The FCBQ will, over the course of a short period of time, force the 
inclusion of a critical mass of women on the boards of French corporations.  
Even though France already accords substantial room for stakeholder 
interests, it seems likely that the FCBQ will further increase the stakeholder 
orientation of those corporations.  As a descriptive matter, more women 
will populate corporate boards. 
Here, “descriptive” has a specific meaning.  Hanna Pitkin first 
explored this concept in The Concept of Representation,197 where she 
distinguished “descriptive” from “interest” representation.198  Her work 
focused on the context of political representation, in which she addressed 
how “descriptive” representation involves “a descriptive likeness between 
representatives and those for whom they stand.”199  This is representation 
by identity.  In this sense, “[a] representative legislature, like a map or a 
mirror, is essentially an inanimate object, a representation of the people in 
the sense that a painting is a representation of what it depicts.”200  A 
descriptive legislature must mirror the public.  In such a case, one ought to 
be represented because of what one is, not for what one does or believes.201  
Pitkin criticized descriptive representation as a static portrait of a society in 
which a group’s representation resides in someone with a like trait.202  By 
contrast, “interest” representation is about the expression of ideas.  Interest 
representation involves a common belief or idea that finds representation in 
someone who agrees with that ideology, without regard to identity.203 
In the corporate context, “descriptive” and “interest” representation 
help explain the effects of the quota with regard to stakeholder interests.  
Stakeholder interests can take the form of either descriptive or interest 
representation.  Although stakeholder perspectives often relate to ideas 
such as environmental concerns, they can also involve descriptive 
representation, such as the presence of worker representatives on a board, a 
requirement common to many European corporate governance regimes.204  
Descriptive representation encompasses certain elements of women’s 
presence on corporate boards.  Women on boards can serve a symbolic 
role.205  As the parties who oversee management, boards sit at the top of the 
 
197 HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). 
198 For an argument regarding the centrality of interest representation for lesbian and gay political 
representation, see generally Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay 
Interests Through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1996).  
199 PITKIN, supra note 197 at 11.  
200 Id.  
201 Id. at 10. 
202 Id.; Guinier, supra note 76, at 1102. 
203 PITKIN, supra note 197; Rosenblum, supra note 198, at 121. 
204 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
205 PITKIN, supra note 197. 
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corporate hierarchy, and the inclusion of women conveys to women lower 
in the hierarchy that their ambition will not be frustrated based on their 
gender. 
Within European corporate governance culture, women may play a 
role comparable to that played by labor representatives.  Like labor 
representatives, they would be present because of their identity as women.  
Women’s presence reflects their place at the table in a similar sense to that 
of labor.  Women differ from labor representatives because the board will 
select them for membership, whereas unions themselves select their 
representatives as separately chosen board members. 
Unlike labor representatives (who presumably favor protecting 
workers’ rights), a woman has no necessary interests in common with other 
women.  Women’s descriptive representation on boards cannot be assumed 
to imply any congruence of interests.  To assert that women on a corporate 
board will represent women’s interests requires leaps of logic beyond the 
scope of this Article.  Without belaboring this point, which will be 
addressed elsewhere,206 it would be challenging to formulate what common 
opinions women hold.  It would be a daunting task just to determine which 
female stakeholders demographic is represented by the women on the 
board.  One can imagine a broad swath of diverse groups of women: 
women employees, women management, women customers, community 
members, and even girls who may eventually seek elevated corporate posts 
could all constitute a group that would conceivably have some stakeholder 
interest in women on boards.  Even if one were to fix an appropriate set of 
these groups, what common interests might they hold?  Although the 
women on boards clearly qualify as a discrete group, their interests would 
be difficult to enumerate.207 
Briefly, we cannot assume that a specific woman, or even a group of 
 
206 Darren Rosenblum will explore questions of identity more closely in a subsequent paper. 
207 The anti-essentialist’s desire to avoid “tokenism” caused by descriptive representation has led to 
calls for interest representation.  Representing ideas rather than identity permits a more fluid conception 
of identity, be it gender, race, or sexual orientation.  See generally Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The 
Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1462 (1991).  Representation of interests prioritizes 
one’s political perspective over one’s identity.  It is worth noting that essentialist identities could also 
lead to interest representation: another critique of descriptive representation centers on the fact that it is 
unclear how to achieve a fair sample of the electorate.  See generally Bernard Grofman, Should 
Representatives Be Typical of their Constituents?, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 
(Bernard Grofman et. al. eds., 1982).  Thus, while anti-essentialism necessitates interest representation, 
interest representation does not require an anti-essentialist understanding of identity.  If identity has no 
causal relation to ideas, representing individuals based on interest becomes paramount in a democracy.  
The challenge with interest representation for women is the indeterminacy of what policies women 
prefer.  Social science reflects some preferences among women for some policies, but these preferences 
may not be easily predictable.  For example, Esther Duflo has examined women’s quotas in India, 
studying the political preferences of women in certain villages and inquiring whether women 
representatives reflect those preferences.  Her conclusion is that such a connection does exist.  See 
Esther Duflo, Why Political Reservations?, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 668, 668–78 (2005). 
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women, on a corporate board will hold any specific interest.208  To assert 
that “women” have some natural commonality with other “women” 
requires an essentialist conception of sex difference.209  Given that “[t]he 
advocacy of descriptive representation can emphasize the worst features of 
essentialism,”210 it is hard to justify descriptive representation.  Nonetheless, 
without descriptive representation or some identity marking the 
 
208 This reflects current understandings of the nature of sex difference, which have veered away 
from presuming an “essential” aspect to sex difference, toward the recognition of the diversity among 
individuals that crosses the sexes.  Judith Butler and other gender theorists articulate understandings of 
gender grounded in performativity rather than fundamental traits.  Anti-essentialist feminism holds that 
no essential notion of ‘womanhood’ exists.  Black feminists such as Bell Hooks and Kimberle 
Crenshaw have emphasized the white nature of such concepts, asserting that one cannot separate race 
from gender. 
208 Gender theorists, led by U.S. thinkers such as Judith Butler, hold that notions of “womanhood” 
depend exclusively on cultural constructs, hence the use of “gender” rather than “sex” reflects a 
constructed, rather than biological, phenomenon.  These doubts lead to a counter theory that identity 
does not determine ideas.  For example, anti-essentialists reject presumptions that women are hard-
wired nurturers, ascribing such behaviors to cultural constructs.  The construction of gender cannot be 
discussed without consideration of transgendered identity.  Transgendered identity demonstrates the 
mutability of gender.  Transgendered people expose the fallacy of the presumption that humanity is 
composed solely of men and women—“gender binarism” calls into question the viability of a fifty-fifty 
scheme for representation unless there is some implicit recognition of how to include transgendered 
people in this scheme.  See generally, Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered 
Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499 (2000).  Although the 
essentialism debate primarily arises with regard to gender, many have raised such questions with regard 
to race.  See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER’S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
CULTURE 45 (1992).   
209 The dichotomy between descriptive and interest representation parallels a dichotomy in the 
women’s identity debate between essentialism and anti-essentialism.  There appears to be a necessary 
relationship between these dichotomies.  Women’s representation quotas appear to presume that a 
woman can only be represented by a woman.  Quotas in this sense rely on essentialism.  Anti-
essentialist theory undermines such notions of fixed identity.  To essentialists, it is without meaning to 
be a woman as opposed to a man.  This theory, it would appear, can only serve to question quotas for 
women’s representation.  Anti-essentialists would hold that a woman is no more likely to represent 
women’s interests than a man.  The extension of this is that if women, as a group, have no traits in 
common, then having fifty percent of all candidates does not achieve any greater likelihood of 
representing women.  Even with a presumption of essentialist identity, one can arrive at the need for 
interest representation.  But can anti-essentialism lead one to support descriptive representation?  The 
question of women’s representation, it seems, cannot be answered with context-less advocacy that 
ignores key anti-essentialist lessons in advocating that women be guaranteed seats to represent women.  
Any particular woman cannot be presumed to represent any other woman, or women as a whole, for 
that matter.  Becker, for example, seems to advocate that women be guaranteed seats to represent 
women, without addressing complexities of identity.  The intriguing element of this issue is that, the 
above anti-essentialist truths notwithstanding, they cannot necessarily be generalized: simply because 
an individual woman cannot be assumed to represent another woman does not mean that if half the 
legislature were women that this legislature would do no better in voicing women’s interests than an 
entirely male legislature.  Although one’s body cannot fully determine one’s politics, some relation 
must be present.  Perhaps a solution is suggested by Gayitri Spivak’s idea of strategic essentialism, or 
Judith Butler’s idea of “contingent epistemology.”  GAYATRI SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN 
CULTURAL POLITICS (1987). 
210 Mansbridge, supra note 77, at 30. 
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representative and the people represented, quotas cannot exist.  The reality 
of the existence of corporate board quotas cannot be separated from 
enforcing some level of descriptive representation of women. 
It can be asserted that the presence of women at the top of the 
corporate hierarchy will necessarily have an impact on the fundamental 
nature of European corporate governance.  In contrast with other corporate 
cultures, European corporations will have more women in more prominent 
positions.  Even without presuming some interest commonality, as a 
descriptive matter, European corporate culture will be feminized in the 
literal sense of having more women participants, particularly in contrast 
with the rest of the developed world where women constitute a far smaller 
percentage of board members. 
As clear as the descriptive argument may be that women’s presence 
renders a corporation more stakeholder-friendly, as a matter of interest 
representation, it remains unclear as to what the impact will be.  As we 
established, the presence of women on the boards of France’s (and possibly 
Europe’s) largest companies will lead to great descriptive representation of 
women on the board, and this descriptive representation, in one important 
yet simple sense, will result in an increase in stakeholder governance as 
women (at least descriptively) constitute stakeholders.  Even if the group 
“women” in this corporate context does not necessarily share some values 
that lead to distinct results, their presence may provide some stakeholder 
representation for women workers, consumers, and community members.  
At the outside, a potential exists that policies such as childcare and other 
issues may shift, but this truly depends on whether people inhabiting the 
category “women” have any common interest. 
Some studies demonstrate that “women” actually have distinct 
perspectives.  If women board members hew to stereotypes (as some 
studies suggest), they would attend to vulnerable populations.  In a 
landmark study on women’s political representation in India, Esther Duflo 
demonstrated that women leaders do in fact hold different opinions from 
male leaders, and these opinions match their represented populations by 
sex.211  If Duflo’s assertions were correct in a broader sense, women board 
members may attend to stakeholder needs, whether those stakeholders are 
women, workers, parents, or other vulnerable populations whose interests 
may be marginalized in a shareholder-driven governance.  Indeed, as David 
Matsa and Amalia Miller’s work explores, women in upper management 
may help advance other women.212  Work that inherently requires creative 
problem solving aspects would benefit from diversity, but in the corporate 
governance context, the effect is tempered because of the nature of the 
 
211 Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a 
Randomized Policy Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409 (2004). 
212 David Matsa & Amalia Miller, Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender Spillovers in 
Corporate Leadership, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 635–39 (2011).  
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work performed by boards.213  The feminization of corporate governance, 
brought about by CBQs in the European context, may lead to still more 
stakeholder-oriented governance.  Even if this phenomenon occurs in a 
small percentage of corporations, it may lead to a notable shift in 
governance overall. 
 
D.  CBQs and the Possible Effect on Entrenched Director Interests 
 
Two counterexamples still exist in and deeply hamper French 
corporate governance practice: first, the exclusive social network of 
directors, and second, the number of cumulative mandates.  The FCBQ will 
help challenge both of these traditional pitfalls. 
One crucial concern regarding the composition of boards in French 
corporations seems to be only partially addressed at the present moment: 
the lack of socio-economic diversity on these boards.  The AFEP-MEDEF 
Code says nothing about necessary social diversity.214  Moreover, it does 
not tackle a related issue and great French “exception”—the very strong 
representation and predominance of some Grandes Écoles on the boards of 
directors of large listed companies.215  Without question, everywhere, the 
market for corporate directors is narrow.  This is understandable as very 
specific skills and expertise are required for such a position.  It may also be 
a sociological tropism: this phenomenon is not unique to the French 
system, but also exists in the United States (with Ivy League graduates) and 
in the United Kingdom (with graduates of prestigious universities like 
Oxford).  However, France is a particularly well-suited and atypical case.216  
The sociological literature documents that, among French business elites, 
two broad and distinct networks coexist: engineers (École Polytechnique) 
and former high-ranking civil servants (École Nationale d’Administration).217  
 
213 The work of Scott Page and Jonathan Macey are informative for this point.  Page’s work 
identifies that diversity provides effective results in tasks that require creativity as opposed to simple 
repetitive tasks.  But what is the nature of the tasks for corporate boards?  Macey’s work divides the 
tasks of corporate boards into monitoring work and management duties.  The inherent function of 
overseeing and approving work doesn’t lend itself to shifts in decision making as a result of increased 
board diversity.  These themes that examine the nature of diversity and its effect on board shifts is the 
focus in subsequent work.  See Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, Sex Regimes and Corporate 
Governance 65 (Working Paper) (on file with author). 
214 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
215 Bang Dang Nguyen, Does the Rolodex Matter? Corporate Elite’s Small World and the 
Effectiveness of Board Directors, 58 MGMT. SCI. 236, 236 (2012); Franics Kramaz & David Thesmar, 
Social Networks in the Boardroom 7 (Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 
1940, 2006). 
216 Id. at 2. 
217 See David Swartz, French Interlocking Directorships: Financial and Industrial Groups, in 
NETWORKS OF CORPORATE POWER: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TEN COUNTRIES (Frans N. 
Stokman ed., 1985); David Swartz, French Corporate Leadership: A Class Based Technocracy, 2 RES. 
POL. SOC. 49 (1986); Charles Kadushin, Friendship Among the French Financial Elite, 60 AM. SOC. 
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Elites are highly concentrated so that these two schools are overrepresented 
among top executives.  Moreover, these educational programs are the 
“virtually unique way”218 of entering high-level jobs.  A recent study, based 
on reliable empirical findings, demonstrated that the presence of developed 
social networks within boards of directors can have a very strong impact on 
the composition of such boards, and a highly negative influence on 
corporate governance practices.219  Although this is one study, one can 
easily imagine that the impact of a small social network, say of people from 
the same school or even the same graduating class, might deploy shortcuts 
in decision making out of trust for one another in ways that diverse 
individuals would not. 
Another concern has emerged, a legal one, explaining that the French 
issue of lack of diversity is not only linked to a sociological cause—an 
exclusive social network club—but also to the legally prescribed pitfall of 
cumulative proxies.  The issue of concurrently held mandates has long 
preoccupied France.  Originally, the Law of July 24, 1966 limited the 
number of mandates that may be concurrently held to eight.220  The Law of 
May 15, 2001 reduced this number to five mandates on boards of directors, 
and the AFEP-MEDEF now recommends the presence of a high number of 
independent directors on boards and various committees.221  Despite these 
developments, statistical studies continue to show a very high level of 
director-consanguinity between CAC 40 and SBF 120 companies.222  Just 
under half of all mandates in the CAC 40 are held by a quarter of their 
directors.223  There are certain SBF 120 companies in which four people are 
executives, but this remains quite rare.  Moreover, French law allows 
several exceptions to the five mandates rule.  In particular, mandates held 
concurrently within a related group of companies only count as one.  
Furthermore, mandates held abroad are not counted.  In addition to the 
difficulties of interpretation to which this law has given rise, these 
exceptions are not justified.  There is no generalized method for counting 
mandates, and the limit on concurrently held mandates do not apply to all 
limited companies, private companies, and joint-stock companies. 
Although the French case is not unique,224 it seems that France has 
 
REV. 202 (1995); Kenneth A. Frank & Jeffrey Y. Yasumoto, Linking Action to Social Structure Within 
a System: Social Capital Within and Between Subgroups, 104 AM. J. SOC. 642 (1998). 
218 Kramaz & Thesmar, supra note 215, at 3. 
219 Id.; Nguyen, supra note 215. 
220 Loi 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les sociétés commerciales [Law 66-537 of July 24, 1966 on 
Commercial Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], July 26, 1966, p. 6402. 
221 CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L225-21 (Fr.). 
222 Kramaz & Thesmar, supra note 215; see also HELEN H. BOLLAERT ET AL., IESEG SCH. OF 
MGMT., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF FRENCH LISTED COMPANIES (2010). 
223 Kramaz & Thesmar, supra note 215. 
224 Nguyen, supra note 215. 
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had the most difficulty in combating the cumulative issue.  The concurrent 
holding of mandates presents three disadvantages: it reduces the variety of 
points of view, limits the renewal of boards of directors, and encourages 
the exchange of “services rendered” among board members who 
consequently give each other reciprocal carte blanche.225  More recent 
concerns against multiple directorships have focused on the challenges of 
dividing one’s focus among several firms, an issue that has surfaced in 
Norway after the implementation of their corporate board quota. 
In spite of its shortcomings, the FCBQ marks an important first step 
toward diversification, even if it is defined by mixité of the sexes rather 
than a broader diversité.  First, without question, a feminized corporate 
culture will appear different, as women, many of whom have different sets 
of professional experiences, take the positions once held by men on 
corporate boards.  Some quota advocates have argued that women’s 
differences will shift corporate culture in a positive fashion.  Such traits 
include process elements such as women’s purported penchant for detail 
and aversion to risk.  There is also the potential that women’s alleged 
concern for social welfare might lead to more socially minded corporations, 
ones that may attend to the interests of weaker parties in market economies. 
We previously observed a correlation between the intervention of the 
legislature and the recent improvement seen in CAC 40 companies in terms 
of gender equality.  Further, we noted that this quantitative progress can be 
evidenced through certain qualitative improvements, given the correlation 
observed between the boards of directors and a certain degree of 
rejuvenation and diversification of skills and points of view on how to run a 
business.  In addition, the introduction of more international profiles in the 
French boards will diminish the presence of the solid networks of directors 
of Grandes Écoles graduates, reduce the tendency towards a concentration 
of monitoring structures, and prevent the risk of director-consanguinity.  In 
practical terms, the participation of women on boards of directors offers a 
larger pool of skills and expertise than when the search for skills is limited 
to the masculine gender. 
Second, the inclusion of women on corporate boards at the mandated 
critical mass levels may shift corporations toward an increased stakeholder 
focus.  In a simplistic, measurable, and identitarian fashion, women on 
corporate boards will descriptively represent women workers, 
customers/clients, and other stakeholder communities, even if the 
 
225 There remains debate as to whether “sufficient diversity” should be required.  Some argue that a 
corporation, even a listed one, is still a private body and should, thus, be free to choose the members of its 
board of directors or supervisory board.  Direct intervention by public authorities or by the European 
Commission in the composition of boards of directors seems neither realistic nor desirable.  It appears that 
such a result would best be achieved with recourse to corporate governance rules recommending greater 
sociological diversity, which may include professionals, academics, foreigners, and stakeholders.  The FCBQ 
should help shift corporate governance towards more diversity. 
R&M_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:36 PM 
 Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of Corporate Governance 
 34:249 (2014)  
 
297 
shareholders that elect them will drive most decision-making.  The question 
surfaces whether women on boards will actually represent a “women’s” 
stakeholder interest.  To make this assertion depends on the veracity of sex 
stereotypes.  Here, should certain stereotypical differences hold, women’s 
presence on boards may be better for employees, as one French study 
suggests.  Women-inclusive boards may also focus more on long-term 
economic results, thus resisting shareholder pressures to attend to short-
term profits.  Such boards may also strike a more attentive posture toward 
other communities.  The possible shift toward stakeholder values may 
result in gender quotas changing a great deal more than gender equality. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION: PROSPECTIVE TRANSATLANTIC CHASM 
 
This Article has argued that the FCBQ will likely further shift French 
corporate governance towards a stakeholder model.  It has also asserted 
that, as more European countries adopt their own CBQs, this shift may 
occur in those countries as well.  Thus, the end result may well be an even 
more stakeholder-oriented European culture of corporate governance—one 
that stands in marked contrast with the United States.  Paradoxically, the 
paucity of European theory of stakeholder governance appears to be offset 
by the profusion of stakeholder practice in European corporate governance.  
The reverse appears to be true in the United States, where shareholder 
primacy reigns even in the wake of the financial crisis.  It may have even 
drawn additional strength within the United States as shareholders accrue 
more power, through “say on pay” provisions, for example.  Cultural and 
sociological variations in the European context and that of the United 
States underscore curious differences between the world’s largest 
economies. 
These findings contradict the assumption of prevalence, not to say 
superiority, of one corporate governance model over another.  Prior to the 
financial crisis, it was customary to presume that the harmonization of 
governance would lead to alignment of corporate governance across 
economies and cultures.  The discrepancies between shareholder theory and 
practice within each of the world’s two largest economies reveal that this 
harmonization is at best tenuous.  Understanding the contrast between 
shareholder and stakeholder-oriented practice matters because theory and 
corporate governance transformation are strongly linked in the United 
States.  Additionally, the shareholder supremacy scholarship has been 
influential in framing the rules, including those articulated in Dodd-Frank, 
upon which the process of globalizing capital markets is based.  It remains 
to be seen whether the stakeholder orientation of European corporate 
governance will remain solely descriptive or if it will encompass the 
representation of interests as well.  We have yet to observe whether the link 
between CBQs and a stakeholder frame will remain a defining, uniquely 
European focus for corporate legal governance, or whether this model will 
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spread to other economies, thus reducing Europe’s distinctiveness with 
respect to corporate governance.  Although it was tempting to establish a 
hierarchy of corporate governance theories,226 recent reforms undertaken in 
European countries, most notably the FCBQ, demonstrate that we are not 
far from the “End of Globalization,”227 especially in a post-crisis era.  
Globalization brought with it rhetoric that rational transnational capital was 
omnipotent and would force the harmonization of legal regimes across the 
world’s major economies.  The effects of FCBQ and similar laws to 
reinforce the stakeholder/shareholder dichotomy suggest that the prospect 
of a harmonized world of uniform corporate governance may be far from 
inevitable. 
 
226 Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 807 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998); 
Jensen, supra note 83. 
227 DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 117, at ch. 9. 
